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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction 
The economic relationship between the African, Caribbean and Pacific group1 (ACP) 
and the European Union (EU) formally the European Economic Community (EEC) 
has a long history that stretches beyond 30 years of Lomé and Yaoundé 
Conventions.2  Formally this relationship started in 1957 when the EU signed an 
Agreement in Yaoundé, Cameroon with the ACP countries3 committing to help the 
latter in promoting their economic and social development.4 The Yaoundé 
Convention allowed for non-reciprocal duty free market access of the imports from 
the ACP countries into the European market. The Convention which had a life span 
of five years was renewed in 1969 for further five years till 1975 hence Yaoundé II 
Convention.5 The structure established in Yaoundé remains the framework for many 
aspects of ACP-EU cooperation until to date.6 Yaoundé II Convention was 
                                                          
1
The ACP group is made up of Seventy Nine Countries, forty eight of them are Sub-Saharan Africa 
sixteen are from the Caribbean and fifteen are from the Pacific. The group comprises of the following 
countries: Angola, Antigua, Barbuda, Belize, Cape Verde, Comoros, Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), 
Congo (Kinshasa), Cook Islands, Cote d‟Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Republic Of Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Rwanda, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Solomon Islands, 
Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, 
Vanuatu, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Available at http://www.acspec.org/en/faq.htm (accessed 1 
September 2010). 
2
Kenya European Union Post Lome Trade Negotiations (KEPLOTRADE) available at 
http://www.trade.go.ke(accessed 10 December 2010). 
3
The ACP group of countries was created under the Georgetown Agreement entered into between the 
ACP countries and the European Union. The Georgetown Agreement defines the main objectives of 
the ACP group as follows; Sustainable development of its members states and their gradual 
integration into the global economy which entails poverty reduction as well as establishing a new 
fairer and more equitable worldwide order; Coordination of the activities of the ACP group to enhance 
implementation of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement; Consolidation of unity, understanding and 
solidarity among ACP countries and finally establishment and consolidation of peace and stability in a 
free and democratic society. Available at http://www.acpsec.org/en/about_htm_website (accessed 3 
November 2010). 
4
ACP-EU Development Cooperation, available at http://www.ACP-EU_Development_Cooperation.org 
(accessed 9 January 2011). 
5
ACP-EU Development Cooperation, available at http://www.ACP-EU_Development_Cooperation.org 
(accessed 9 January 2011). 
6
ACP-EU Development Cooperation, available at http://www.ACP-EU_Development_Cooperation.org 
(accessed 9 January 2011). 
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succeeded by a new Agreement known as the Lomé Convention which was signed 
in the capital of Togo in 1975. 
The Lomé Convention was signed by nine European Commission (EC) member 
states and 46 ACP countries.7 The Lomé Convention like its predecessor 
established a trade system that was both preferential and non-reciprocal.8Under the 
Lomé Conventions ACP countries enjoyed non-reciprocal trade preferences where 
many of their products were granted duty free-quota free access to the EU market 
whereas ACP countries could apply barriers on imports from the EU market. 
However, these preferences were not extended to non-ACP countries and therefore 
violated the requirements of non-discrimination principle among the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) members as set out in Article 1.1 of the WTO‟s General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947.9 
The illegality of the EU discriminatory measure came before the Dispute Settlement 
Body through the EC Bananas case10 as a complaint lodged by certain Latin 
American countries.11 It was not until the EU lost the case twice that it was forced to 
retreat and seek a WTO waiver that saw the continuation of the EU-ACP relationship 
to the expiry of its term in 2000.12 
After the expiry of the Lomé Convention in 2000, the parties agreed to negotiate a 
new trading arrangement in response to the shortcomings of the Lomé regime which 
was in conformity to the GATT/WTO requirements on non-discrimination. In 2000 in 
                                                          
7
ACP-EU Development Cooperation, available at http://www.ACP-EU_Development_Cooperation.org 
(accessed 9 January 2011). 
8
UNCTAD and UNDP „Trade Negotiations and Africa: Policy Issues for African Countries in 
Multilateral and Regional Trade Negotiations‟ (2006) 27 Series No.3, available at 
http://www.unctad.org (accessed 25 September 2010).  
9
Article 1.1 provides „With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for 
imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with 
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to 
all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or 
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties‟.  
10
WT/DS 27/1 European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
available at http://wto.org.innopac.uatac.za/english (accessed 9 January 2010). 
11
Desta MG „EC-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements and WTO Compatibility: An experiment in 
North-South Inter-Regional Agreements?‟ (2006) 43 Common Law Review 1356. 
12
Udombana JN „Back to the Basics: The ACP-EU Cotonou Trade Agreement and Challenges for the 
African Union‟ (2004) 40Texas International Law Journal 69. 
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Cotonou Benin, the ACP countries and the EU member states signed a partnership 
Agreement commonly referred to as Cotonou Agreement. The Agreement is to 
remain in force for a period of 20 years. The Cotonou Agreement contrary to the 
previous Lomé Conventions requires the new trading arrangements between the 
parties to be WTO compatible.13 
In this regard it was imperative that the EU-ACP countries enter into new trade 
Agreements that were WTO compatible, hence the Economic Partnership 
Agreements14 (EPAs). The EPAs key feature is their reciprocity and their non-
discriminatory nature.15 African countries through various regional integration blocks 
have been negotiating EPAs with the European Union (EU). 
The EPAs are meant to replace the Cotonou Agreement which governs trade 
relations between EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific group (ACP). However, 
for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) within the ACP group that have not 
negotiated EPAs  with the EU, the Cotonou Agreement will still regulate the non-
reciprocal trade benefits received under the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
Regulation.16 
The EPAs were set to be signed by 31December 2007 and begin implementation on 
1January 2008. The EU and ACP have been trading under a WTO waiver that 
expired on 31December 2007. The EU-ACP waiver enabled the WTO partners to 
trade with non-reciprocal preferences by enforcing the special and differential 
treatment. 
Due to expiry of the waiver, current trade under the Cotonou Agreement could not 
continue, in this regard the EU and ACP countries had to conclude a new trade 
Agreement except the LDCs who can continue enjoying non-reciprocal trade benefits 
                                                          
13
UNCTAD and UNDP „Trade Negotiations and Africa: Policy Issues for African Countries in 
Multilateral and Regional Trade Negotiations‟ (2006) 29 Series No.3, available at 
http://www.unctad.org (accessed 25 September 2010).  
14
EPAs are a trade regime meant to ensure the continued enjoyment of trade preferences by the 
countries that sign them on the EU market beyond the expiry of the Cotonou trade regime. Their 
compatibility with WTO shields them against legal challenges by any WTO member.  
15
WTO Compatible Trading Arrangements, available at http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/index (accessed 
8 October 2010). 
16
EBA Regulation grants duty-free access to imports of all products from LDCs to the EU market, 
except arms and ammunitions without any quantitative restrictions (with the exception of sugar, 
bananas and rice for a limited period). Available at http://www.ec.europa.eu/trade (accessed 19 
October 2010). 
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under EBA and South Africa.17 The EPAs must be geared towards trade 
liberalisation and the special trade preferences given by the EU cannot continue as 
was in the past.18 The Cotonou Agreement and the EPAs constitute independent 
legal entities but have common goals, namely; to promote sustainable economic 
development and contribute to poverty eradication by fostering the smooth gradual 
integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.19 It is in the context of these 
goals that EPAs are referred to as not only an instrument of economic and trade 
cooperation but also as an instrument of development in the ACP countries. 
The EPAs will definitely have an impact on regional integration in Africa. 
Negotiations of the EPAs are being conducted separately within seven of the sub 
groupings under the ACP groupings.20 The impacts of EPAs on economic 
developments of each member country cannot be underscored. Some of the African 
countries are of the view that EPAs do not represent their interests and that they are 
being forced into the EPAs.21  
However, one cannot deny that there is need for a continued trade relationship 
between the EU and ACP countries. In essence EPA can be seen as a catalyst to 
the East African Community‟s 22 (EAC) development that will promote and 
consolidate regional integration and fast track the integration of the EAC into the 
global economy.23 
The EAC-EU EPA negotiations to open trade between the EAC and EU are still on 
the table. A deal was first initialled in 2007 between the EAC and EU. This was the 
Framework for an Economic Partnership Agreement (FEPA) drafted as a temporary 
stand-in to await a mutually agreed EPA but a formal deal has not since been 
                                                          
17
South Africa continues to export under its own Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU, the Trade 
Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) which was concluded in 2000. Available at 
http://www.acp.eu.trade.org (accessed 15 October 2010). 
18
The main objective of the EPAs is the establishment of a free trade area in line with Article 24 of the 
GATT 1994 (liberalization of „substantially all trade‟) see Why EPA Negotiations? Available at 
http://www.acp-eu-trade.org (accessed 25 September 2010). 
19
UNCTAD and UNDP „Trade Negotiations and Africa: Policy Issues for African Countries in 
Multilateral and Regional Trade Negotiations‟ 17 Series No.3 available at http://www.unctad.org 
(accessed 25 September 2010). 
20
 See Section 4.3 of this study for the ACP-EPA regional configurations. 
21
Wagner D „Impacts of EPAs: The Scramble for East Africa‟ available at 
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/65419 (accessed 1 August 2010). 
22
EAC country members are: Republic of Burundi, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Rwanda, United 
Republic of Tanzania and Republic of Uganda. 
23
EU-EAC EPA Negotiations held in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania on 9 June 2010, available at 
http://www.eac.int/news (accessed 25 August 2010).  
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reached because of an impasse over several key issues.24 The implications of these 
issues have raised concerns among EPA critics for example former President of 
Tanzania Benjamin Mkapa arguing that EPAs are meant to stifle Africa‟s growth and 
that European efforts to secure access to EAC can be likened to the infamous 1884 
Berlin-Conference, dubbed the Scramble for Africa.25 
The EAC countries were set to sign the EPA and usher in freer trade between the 
two regions by the end of November 2010.26 The major question looming on the 
minds of the citizens of the regional block is whether the newly integrated common 
market which is still finding its feet will remain strong and united. 
The final Agreement today remains unsigned; business between the two regions is 
therefore in an unpredictable and uncertain environment. The EAC-EU EPA 
negotiations have been dogged by a number of controversial issues including the 
meaning of market access to the EU by EAC countries and the strict rules of origin 
and strict sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures27 making it difficult for the EAC 
goods to penetrate into the EU market.28 
In addition a number of regional bodies including the East African Business Council 
and the East African Legislative Assembly have resolved to delay the signing of the 
EPA in its current form and urged the EU to work with the EAC to include interests of 
both parties.29 Looking at this unpredictable scenario it is hard to guarantee that the 
EAC-EU EPA will contribute to trade development within the EAC. 
On the other hand the conclusion of EAC-EU EPA negotiations, are seen as an 
avenue of promoting the regional integration process and notably supporting 
                                                          
24
Key unresolved issues are: losing export taxes that protect domestic industries against highly 
competitive and cheap European goods; EU concessions on economic and development cooperation 
and the Most Favoured Nation clause (MFN) that would force the EAC to duplicate for Europe any 
preferential agreements with for example China or India: Wagner D, Impacts of EPAs : The Scramble 
for East Africa available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/65419 (accessed 1 
August 2010). 
25
Wagner D „Impacts of EPAs: The Scramble for East Africa‟ available at 
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/65419 (accessed 1 August 2010). 
26
EU-EAC EPA Negotiations held in Dar es Salaam, available at http://www.eac.int/news (accessed 
25 August 2010). 
27
Measures, regulations or procedures on food safety, animal and plant health standards taken by any 
WTO member based on scientific evidence. Available at http://www.wto.org/english (accessed 3 
October 2010). 
28
EU Faults Mkapa on EPA, The Citizen Daily via allfrica.com, 6 April 2010, available at 
http://www.allafrica.com/stories (accessed 28 August 2010). 
29
Wagner D „Impacts of EPAs: The Scramble for East Africa‟ available at http://www.pambazuka.org 
(accessed 1 August 2010). 
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measures taken by regional groupings themselves to open up trade with their 
neighbours and wider international community.30 This is in the light that the EU is 
seen as the EAC‟s largest market therefore EAC will have a wider market access for 
its goods. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
This study aims at analysing the EAC-EU EPA negotiations and investigates the 
effects of EPA on trade development within the EAC having regard to the Common 
Market which came in force on 1July 2010. In so doing the study will also draw 
experiences from the EU-SADC (minus) EPA negotiations where only five SADC 
member countries participated (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and 
Swaziland) and EU-CARIFORUM EPA negotiations. 
Kenya being the only non-LDC within the EAC is in a dilemma of facing tariffs on its 
key exports to the EU market if it does not sign the EPA, yet doing so will foreclose 
its development31 options thus endangering its economy. Close to 80 per cent of the 
Kshs 70 billion worth of horticultural produce that Kenya exports every year is 
purchased in Europe.32 The Kenya Flower Council‟s Chief Executive Officer Jane 
Ngige made the following observation „When EU governments begin to levy import 
taxes on Kenya‟s horticultural produce, we will lose a big pie of our market because 
the final prices to consumers will be much higher than those offered by many 
competitors who have since come up even within Europe itself‟.33 
The other four EAC member countries being LDCs have the option to continue 
enjoying duty free quota free market access into the EU market under the EBA 
Regulation. Consequently they may not have immediate need to conclude a full EPA 
to avoid tariffs being increased on their exports to the EU. In light of the foregoing the 
                                                          
30
Joint EAC-EU Communiqué on the Framework for an Economic Partnership Agreement (FEPA) and 
negotiations for the comprehensive EPAs dated 9June 2010, available at http://www.eac.int/new 
(accessed 25 August 2010). 
31
South Centre „EPAs: The Wrong Development Model for Africa and Options for the Future‟ 
Analytical Note SC/TDP/AN/EPA/23 (2010) 4, available at http://www.southcentre.org (accessed 25 
August 2010). 
32
Omondi G „Fear of exploitation mars East Africa trade talk‟ Business Daily Nairobi 16 November 
2010 available at http://www.tralac.org (accessed 25 August 2010). 
33
Jane Ngige in an interview with business daily Nairobi 6 April 2010 available at http://www.tralac.org 
(accessed 25 August 2010). 
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study shall endeavour to explore possible alternatives for the EAC members to the 
current situation.34 
It is without doubt that there is a need to emphasize trade development in the EAC 
and more importantly give the newly integrated group more voice at the international 
arena.35 The implementation of EPAs will inevitably pose a number of severe 
challenges especially loss of expected fiscal revenue due to elimination of tariffs.36 In 
this respect the study will endeavour to analyse the provisions of the EAC-EU EPA 
and explore from a legal perspective with a view to determining how the same 
should be designed and implemented effectively in order to ensure that EAC is 
integrated into the global market as well as regional integration is enhanced. 
1.3 Limitations of the Study 
In view of the fact that EPA negotiations are taking place within seven sub-groupings 
in Africa which is a wider perspective, this study will be confined to the EAC-EU EPA 
negotiations. However the research will draw experiences from the EU-SADC 
(minus) EPA negotiations where only five SADC countries participated (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland) and the EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
negotiations. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The research will mainly be conducted through literature review. The primary 
sources will be articles, books and research papers written by experts and various 
organisations in the field. 
The secondary sources will include textbooks and trade Agreements. The research 
will also make use of data and statistics relating to trade relationship between EU 
and EAC member countries. 
                                                          
34
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV: Intra-
African Trade (2010) 16. 
35
Wolfe B Regional Integration in Africa: Lessons from the East African Community (2008) 63 South 
African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). 
36
South Centre „EPAs: The Wrong Development Model for Africa and Options for the Future‟ 
Analytical Note SC/TDP/AN/EPA/23 (2010) 8 available at http://www.southcentre.org (accessed 25 
August 2010). 
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The research will draw experiences from EU-SADC (minus) EPA negotiations and 
EU-CARIFORUM EPA negotiations. 
1.5 Significance of the Research 
According to a report presented by a section of civil society within the EAC in 2007 it 
is estimated that upon implementation of the EPA, the EAC will incur revenue loss of 
US$ 162.5 million every year due to lost revenue from imports on EU goods.37 In 
addition reciprocity which is the key principle of EPA negotiations has twofold effects: 
trade creation and trade diversion.  
Trade creation has the effect of flooding the EAC market with cheap goods from EU 
hence creating competition for the local goods. On the other hand trade diversion 
has the likelihood of causing regional turbulence since intra trade might be reduced 
to a greater extent.38 
It is against this background that this study seeks to find possible ways of 
counteracting these possible implications which might be visited upon the EAC once 
the provisions of the EPAs become legally binding. 
1.6 Problem Statement 
The EPAs are designed to end non-reciprocal preferential trade of goods from 
developing countries into European markets by taking down trade barriers against 
European goods flowing the other way. The EPAs make open trade a two-way 
street. This may have the effect of causing influx of goods from the European market 
and yet the EAC does not export so much to the EU market. Many industries in the 
EAC are infant industries and hence need a tariff wall, without it the community is 
likely to face deindustrialisation.39 
In addition, for various reasons the EAC does not seem to have enough concerns 
about the impacts of EPAs; most important being that they could have blind 
                                                          
37
CSOs analysis of possible implications of EU-EAC EPA deal, 2007. CSO is a joint consortium of 
Kenya civil Society Alliance, Tanzania Trade Coalition and Uganda Food Rights Alliance. Available at 
http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache (accessed 24 September 2010).  
38
South Centre „EPAs: The Wrong Development Model for Africa and Options for the Future‟ 
Analytical Note (2010) 16, available at http://www.southcentre.org (accessed 25 August 2010). See 
also Section 3.6 of this study for analysis on intra-trade. 
39
South Centre „EPAs: The Wrong Development Model for Africa and Options for the Future‟ 
Analytical Note (2010) 6, available at http://www.southcentre.org (accessed 25 August 2010). 
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confidence in the effects of free trade agreements regardless of the foundational 
condition of reciprocity.40 This view could prove to be an erroneous and dangerous 
experiment for enhanced integration within the EAC.  
In light of the above the major issue meriting investigation is whether the EPAs will 
undermine or accelerate trade development within the EAC. 
1.7 Research Hypothesis 
The investigative assumption which the proposed research will examine is that the 
implementation of EPAs will undermine trade development within the EAC. This is 
due to the fact that studies have shown that there will be estimated loss of revenue 
of US$162.5 million every year due to lost revenue from imports on EU imports.41 In 
this regard the study will endeavour to seek answers to the following research 
questions: 
 How will the EAC manage the expected losses of fiscal revenue as a result of 
elimination of taxes on EU imports? 
 What are the effects of the reciprocal principle as propounded in the EPAs on 
trade development within the EAC? 
 What will be the impact of EPAs on regional integration within the EAC 
especially with regard to the newly integrated common market? 
 
1.8 Key Words  
European Union (EU)-East African Community (EAC)-Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs)-Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)-Everything But Arms (EBA)-
Least Developed Countries (LDCs)-World Trade Organization (WTO) 
1.9  Proposed Chapter Breakdown 
 
 
                                                          
40
Jianxiang L, The European Union Relationship to the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Countries in 
terms of the Cotonou Agreement: Will the Economic Partnership Agreements Aid Regional 
Integration? (Unpublished LLM Mini Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2005) 2. 
41
CSOs analysis of possible implications of EU-EAC EPA deal, 2007 available at 
http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache (accessed 24 September 2010). 
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Chapter One 
This will introduce the subject matter, identify the problem statement, research 
questions and describe the methodology to be applied in the research as well as the 
limitations of the study. 
Chapter Two 
This chapter will discuss the historical overview of trade relations between the EU 
and ACP countries. In this regard the chapter will look at the Yaoundé I & II 
Conventions, the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreements.                      
Chapter Three 
This will discuss regional integration. EPA negotiations are taking place in regional 
integration groups. The EAC is holding talks with the EU as a regional block. It is 
therefore imperative to look at the process of regional integration and the 
understanding of regional trade agreements and the concept of free trade area.  
The history and evolution of the EAC to its current state will also be discussed. The 
chapter will also look at trade trends within the EAC. 
Chapter Four 
This chapter will discuss the concept of EPAs, the initiation and current 
developments in the EAC-EU EPA negotiations. 
The EAC‟s Common Market  came into force on 1st July 2010.EPAs will undoubtedly 
have an impact on the EAC which is still trying to stand on its feet and also due to 
the fact that economic developments of the five members countries are at different 
stages.42 To this end the research will bear focus on the impacts of the EAC-EU EPA 
on trade developments within the EAC. 
Chapter Five 
The chapter will give conclusions of the research and highlight possible solutions to 
the problems posed by the EU-EAC EPA negotiations and recommendation.
                                                          
42
Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi are all least developed countries while Kenya is a 
developing country. 
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CHAPTER TWO   
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND AFRICAN CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES 
2.1 Introduction 
The relationship between the European Community (EC) and the former European 
colonies African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries dates back to the colonial 
era and to the origins of the EC.1 
This relationship has undergone various stages from Yaoundé Conventions2 to 
Lomé Conventions3 and finally to Cotonou Agreement4 which is set to pave way for a 
new trading arrangement between the ACP countries  and the European Union (EU) 
which is compatible with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. 
It is against this background that this chapter seeks to illustrate a brief historical 
background of the Yaoundé Conventions, Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou 
Agreement to help the reader understand certain key aspects of the current 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations and design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
EU „Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries: Challenges and 
options for a new partnership‟ available at http://europa.eu/int/comm/development/body/publications/I-
vert/lv1_en.pdf#zoom (accessed 20 January 2011). 
2
The Yaoundé Conventions were concluded in two stages, Yaoundé I and II. 
3
The Lomé Conventions were concluded in four stages, Lomé I, II, III and IV. 
4
The Cotonou Agreement signed in June 2000 established the basis for a new trading regime 
between the EU and ACP countries. 
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2.2 Yaoundé Conventions 
The antecedents of Lomé Conventions were Yaoundé Conventions. The formal 
relationship between the EU and the ACP countries started with the Treaty of Rome 
which established the European Economic Community (ECC) in 1957.5 However, 
even before the Treaty of Rome came into force five of the six members of the EEC 
had some colonies and dependencies.6 These colonies and dependencies were 
deemed to be extensions of their respective European countries that colonised them 
and this made it necessary to have the colonies incorporated into the Treaty.7 
Article 131 of the Treaty of Rome made provision for the establishment of the trade 
relationship. The main purpose of this relationship as envisaged under Article 131 
was to promote the economic and social development of countries and territories 
and to establish close economic relations between them and the community as a 
whole.8  The Treaty of Rome created an avenue for cooperation with the Overseas 
Countries and Territories9 (OCTs) of the six signatory countries which were 
Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Holland. 
Part IV of the Treaty of Rome established an association between the EEC and the 
overseas territories. Articles 131-136 of the Treaty sets out the terms of the 
association and highlights the Implementing Convention10 which was annexed to the 
Treaty. The Implementing Convention established what was perceived to be free 
trade area between the community and the overseas dependencies as well as the 
European Development Fund (EDF) which was supposed to be a source of 
supplementary aid. 
With the Treaty of Rome coming into force, the EEC began providing special 
preferences to imports from overseas colonies and dependencies of France. By 
                                                          
5
David D ‟40 years of Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2002) 2 (hereafter Europe-ACP Relationship) 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/courier/courier_acp (accessed 5 
January 2011). 
6
The five members were Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg the Netherlands and West Germany. 
7
Hurt SR „Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and 
ACP States and the end of the Lomé Convention‟ (2003) 24 Third World Quarterly 162. 
8
Treaty Establishing the European Community as amended by subsequent Treaties,1957 available at 
http://www.hri.org/docs/Rome57/ (accessed 18 January 2011) 
9
These overseas countries and territories were essentially West and African countries which had 
close ties with France. 
10
According to Article 136 of the Treaty of Rome, the Implementing Convention was slated for 5 years 
after the entry into force of the Treaty. The Implementing Convention was to determine the details and 
procedure for the association of the countries and territories with the Community. 
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1960s some of the former colonies had gained independence from the European 
colonial powers. In 1963 representatives of the EEC member states and 17 African 
Associated and Madagascar countries (AASM) met in Yaoundé Cameroon and 
signed an Agreement which came to be known as the Yaoundé Convention.11 The 
Yaoundé Convention was geared mainly towards financial, technical and trade 
cooperation, primarily in the sectors of economic and social infrastructure.12 
The Convention allowed for non-reciprocal duty free market access of the imports 
from the AASM countries into European market. Yaoundé I was expected to put the 
interests of the new states at the forefront. However, contrary to expectation of the 
many the Convention seemed like a replica of Part IV Treaty of Rome.13 The 
structure of the Yaoundé Convention was probably not intended by the new states. 
However, one of the contributing factors of the outcome would be lack of negotiation 
skills amongst the newly independent states. Secondly the newly independent states 
could have been blinded by the obsession for financial assistance from the EEC thus 
giving the EEC an upper hand in conjuring them to accept to its terms.14 
The Yaoundé Convention was officially aimed at strengthening the economic 
independence of the „associated‟ states which eventually proved a contradiction in 
terms-promote their industrialisation and encourage African regional integration. 
Central to the Convention was the argument that the relationship between Europe 
and Africa was historically necessary and economically a sine qua non.15 
France however, intended that these countries would form a free trade zone 
amongst themselves and eventually sign a reciprocal Agreement with the EEC as a 
regional trade group.16 Lecomte observes that Yaoundé I &II Conventions eventually 
failed to create this EEC-Africa free trade zone for three main reasons: First, the 
newly independent African states embarked on self-centred development strategies 
which relied inter alia on protectionist trade policies. Therefore they showed no 
                                                          
11
ACP-EU Development Cooperation, available http://www.ACP-EU_Development_Cooperation.org 
(accessed 9 January 2011). 
12
David D ‟Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2002) 1. 
13
Guy Martin „Africa and the Ideology of Eurafrica: Neo-Colonialism or Pan-Africanism?‟ 1982 The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 223. 
14
David D ‟Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2002) 2. 
15
Lecomte HB „Effectiveness of Developing Country Participation in ACP-EU Negotiations‟ (2001) 8 
(hereafter Developing Country Participation in ACP-EU Negotiations) available at 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3619.pdf (accessed 20 January 2011). 
16
Lecomte HB „Developing Country Participation in ACP-EU Negotiations‟ (2001) 8. 
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readiness to provide trade preferences to their European partners. Secondly, the 
French international firms which had been benefitting from traditional preferential 
positions in ex-French colonies were keen to protect themselves from other potential 
European competitors. Finally the United States opposed Europe making Africa its 
restricted „backyard‟ fearing that Europe would gain privileged access to African 
markets and natural resources at its expense.17 
The Yaoundé I expired in 1968 thus paving way for Yaoundé II in 1969 which was  
slated to be in force for five years until 1975. 
It is thus interesting to note that the idea of a free trade zone between Europe and 
Africa reincarnated in the EC‟s proposal for ACP-EU Economic Partnership 
Agreement is actually an old vision explicitly reminiscent of colonial times. 
2.3 The Lomé Conventions 
The Lomé Conventions were said to provide a legal framework for the ACP-EU 
partnership and reputed to be „the largest, the most comprehensive and most 
enduring north-south multilateral accords of the time‟.18  The Lomé Conventions 
arose out of attempts by the EU to establish an institutionalised arrangement 
governing its relations with former colonies of its members. The Convention 
developed from a colonial association of African territories to the EEC based on a 
mixture of moral obligation to compensate the former colonial countries and on the 
self-interest of the European States.19 Under the Lomé Conventions the ACP 
countries were generally entitled to non-reciprocal duty free access to EU markets, 
technical and industrial cooperation and economic assistance under the European 
Development Fund (EDF) as well as insurance schemes. 
The initial Lomé Agreement was signed in 1975 as the Lomé I Convention and 
covered 46 ACP and nine EU countries.20 Lomé I Convention was slated to be in 
force for 5 years. Its main characteristics were: non-reciprocal preferences for most 
exports from the ACP to EU countries; equality between partners, respect for 
                                                          
17
Lecomte HB „Developing Country Participation in ACP-EU Negotiations‟ (2001) 9. 
18
David D ‟Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2000) 3. 
19
David D ‟Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2000) 3. 
20
Karl K „From Georgetown to Cotonou: The ACP Group faces up to New Challenges‟ available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/courier/courier_acp/en/en_020.pdf (accessed 24 
January 2011) 
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sovereignty, mutual interests and interdependence; the right of each state to 
determine its own policies; and finally security of relations based on the 
achievements of the cooperation system.21  The non-reciprocal preferences meant 
that although trade preferences were offered to ACP countries the EU did not 
demand trade advantages in return. However, since the preferences were only 
offered to certain countries, they were discriminatory against those countries that 
were not signatories to the Lomé Conventions. 
One of the greatest achievements that Lomé I Convention is hailed for is the 
introduction of STABEX (stabilisation of export earnings) system, which was 
designed to compensate ACP countries for the shortfall in export due to fluctuations 
in the prices or supply in commodities.22 STABEX provided funds to offset losses 
incurred as a result of crops failure and price falls for a wide number of agricultural 
products like cocoa, coffee, groundnuts, tea and others.  
Lomé I Convention also prioritised infrastructure-roads, bridges, hospitals, schools 
and sustainable agriculture and created protocols which were geared to favour ACP 
exports in sectors such as sugar, beef and bananas. Under the Sugar Protocol, the 
EEC agreed to fix quantity annually of sugar from ACP countries at an attractively 
high guaranteed price aligned to EU‟s own internal sugar price and established 
annual quotas for sugar producers. This arrangement has been valuable to the 
economic development of certain ACP countries like Mauritius, Fiji, Guyana, and 
Barbados. The Beef and Veal Protocol permitted a 90 per cent refund of tax normally 
paid on beef imports from several ACP countries and has especially benefitted 
Southern African countries.23 
The Lomé I went through various amendments and hence in 1979 Lomé II came in 
force, Lomé III in 1984 and Lomé IV in 1989. Lomé II which involved 58 ACP and 
nine EU countries did not introduce major changes to Lomé I except for the SYSMIN 
                                                          
21
EUROPA „The Lomé Convention‟ available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotomou/lome_history_en.htm (accessed 21 January 
2011). 
22
David D ‟Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2000) 3. 
23
EUROPA „The Lomé Convention‟ available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotomou/lome_history_en.htm (accessed 21 January 
2011). 
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system to help in the mining industries ACP countries that were dependent on this 
sector.24 
Lomé III which covered 65 ACP countries and ten EU states coincided with an in-
depth review of the effectiveness of aid and the emergence of a political dimension.25 
In this regard it understandably shifted the main attention of the relationship from the 
promotion of industrial development to self-reliant development on the basis of self-
sufficiency and food security. It also alluded to the importance of human dignity 
(rather than human rights) and stressed economic, social and cultural rights.26 
Lomé IV covered 68 ACP countries and 12 EU states and was remarkable in many 
ways. The Convention for the first time was drawn up for a 5 years period.27 It laid 
great emphasis on among other things; the promotion of human rights, democracy 
and good governance; decentralised cooperation; diversification of ACP countries; 
promotion of the private sector and increasing regional cooperation. It was the first 
development Agreement to set such a standard.  
Other key changes under Lomé IV included the conversion of all uncommitted 
special loans under previous Lomé Conventions into grants, the banning of toxic 
waste movements between ACP countries and EU member states and the provision 
of more EDF monies for decentralised cooperation and diversification of the 
economy.  
Lomé IV Convention was revised at its midterm review in 1995. The review was due 
to major economic and political changes in ACP countries (democratisation process 
and structural adjustments in these countries), enlargement and increasing attention 
to East European Mediterranean partners and lastly the international environment 
which was with regard to the Uruguay Round Agreement.28 All these factors 
necessitated a review of Lomé IV. The amendment for the first time did not increase 
EDF in real terms but laid great emphasis on human rights, democratic principles 
                                                          
24
David D ‟Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2000) 4. 
25
David D ‟Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2000) 4. 
26
Article 5 of the Lomé III Convention. 
27
Article 366 of the Lomé IV Convention. 
28
EUROPA „The Lomé Convention‟ available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotomou/lome_history_en.htm (accessed 21 January 
2011). 
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and the rule of law as essential elements of the Convention.29 This in essence meant 
that the ACP countries that did not fulfil these criteria risked the retrieval of the 
allocated funds. The amendment also introduced a phased programming aimed at 
increasing flexibility and improving performances from ACP countries giving more 
attention to decentralised cooperation in the form of a participatory partnership 
including a great variety of actors from civil society.30 
In the years leading to the expiration of the Lomé IV Convention ACP-EU 
cooperation faced pressure on several fronts. ACP countries felt that the principle of 
equal partnership had been eroded and replaced with a relationship based on 
conditionality.31 For instance they felt that the EU laid more emphasis on human 
rights, democratic principles and the rule of law and violation of these „essential 
elements‟ could lead to partial or total suspension of development aid. 
Moreover despite preferential access to EU markets, ACP export performance was 
deteriorating over time. Finally with the emergence of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) the non-reciprocal preferential trade regime provided by the Lomé 
Convention was increasingly seen as unacceptable and incompatible with 
international trade rules in the sense of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) Article XXIV.32 All these arguments highlighted the need for a re-appraisal of 
development cooperation in general and of ACP-EU cooperation and its trade 
elements in particular. 
The overall achievement of the Lomé Conventions era has been viewed with mixed 
reactions. Some believe that their major achievement is the overall relationship with 
developing regions, particularly those where many of the world‟s poorest countries 
(about 40 ACP countries) are located.33 However, looking at the other side of the 
coin a number of ACP countries have reaped positively from the various Lomé 
Conventions to wit, economic and social infrastructures, technical and financial aid 
                                                          
29
David D ‟Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2000) 4. 
30
David D ‟Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2000) 4. 
31
Lionel, Mitaritonna & Laborde „An Impact Study of the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements 
in the Six ACP Regions‟ European Union Report (2008) 37 available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/march/tradoc_138081.pdf  (accessed 3 March 2011). 
32
Lionel, Mitaritonna & Laborde „An Impact Study of the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements 
in the Six ACP Regions‟ European Union Report (2008) 37 available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/march/tradoc_138081.pdf (accessed 3 March 2011). 
33
David D „Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2000) 4. 
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programmes in various sectors, access to European market for some of their 
produce, assistance in implementing effective macro-economic policies and support 
for structural adjustment initiatives.34 
However, others think differently insisting for example that half of the ACP countries 
are ranked as Least Developing Countries (LDCs) despite a quarter of a century of 
ACP-EU economic and trade cooperation. One would also allude the poor results of 
the Lomé policy partly to the fact that it emphasised export of agricultural products to 
the EU without challenging the ACP countries to develop competitive industrial 
manufacturing. Consequently the result has been that, even with seemingly 
generous nonreciprocal concessions to ACP countries, their share of the EU market 
has declined considerably over the years.35 
Despite the criticisms the Lomé Conventions achieved much for the ACP countries 
than the Yaoundé Conventions. This is because the Lomé Conventions were based 
on equal partnership as a cornerstone for cooperation which vested on the ACP 
countries with the ownership of their own development. This meant in spite of 
receiving financial aid from the EU countries, the ACP countries were also expected 
to contribute towards development of their country especially by ensuring good 
governance and putting in place policies geared towards development. In this regard 
the Lomé Conventions focused on two key elements; economic and commercial 
cooperation and development cooperation. Therefore they contained both aspects of 
aid and trade.36 
2.4 The Cotonou Agreement 
The end of the updated Lomé IV Convention in 2000 led to the conclusion of the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement in Cotonou, Benin by 77 ACP countries and 15 EU 
                                                          
34
Karl K „From Georgetown to Cotonou: The ACP Group faces up to New Challenges‟ available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/courier/courier_acp/en/en_020.pdf (accessed 24 
January 2011). 
35
Karl K „From Georgetown to Cotonou: The ACP Group faces up to New Challenges‟ available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/courier/courier_acp/en/en_020.pdf (accessed 24 
January 2011). 
36
David D „Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2000) 4. 
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member states. The Agreement was set for a 20 year period with a clause allowing it 
to be revised every five years.37 
The partnership is centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating 
poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual 
integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.38 The fundamental 
principles of the Cotonou Agreement are; equality of the partners and ownership of 
development strategies; participation(central governments as the main partners, 
partnership open to different kinds of other actors); pivotal role of dialogue and the 
fulfilment of mutual obligations; differentiation and regionalisation.39 
Differing from the Lomé Conventions the Cotonou Agreement enshrines the principle 
of participatory development. In addition the Cotonou Agreement is keen on 
strengthening of the political dimensions of the partnership. The strong political 
foundation of the Agreement which is defined by tight conditionality is evidenced by 
the fact that the Agreement is underpinned by a set of core values or essential 
elements such as respect for human rights, democratic principles and rule of law 
whose violation can lead to suspension of the aid.40 By virtue of Article 96 good 
governance is considered to be a fundamental element of the Cotonou Agreement.41 
Serious cases of corruption including acts of bribery leading to corruption are 
grounds to suspend cooperation. This is seen as a major step by the EU to 
encourage the concept of good governance in the trading partners. Moreover the 
Agreement envisages deepening of the regional integration process between ACP 
countries, preparation of a new WTO compatible trade policy and a more rationalised 
performance-based aid management. 
                                                          
37
European Centre for Development Policy Management „The Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 
Brief‟ available at http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Navigation.nsf/index2?readform 
(accessed 21 January 2011). 
38
Article 1 of the Cotonou Agreement. 
39
EuropeAid Development and Cooperation „Overview of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (The 
Cotonou Agreement)‟ available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-
agreement/index_en.htm. 
40
 Lionel, Mitaritonna & Laborde „An Impact Study of the CAP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements 
in the Six ACP Regions‟ European Union Report (2008) 37 available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/march/tradoc_138081.pdf (accessed 3 March 2011). 
41
Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement calls for a thorough examination of the action of a party where 
there is failure to fulfil an obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles 
and rule of law. 
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The Cotonou Agreement provides ACP countries with an extension of existing 
nonreciprocal preferential access for certain ACP agricultural and other goods to the 
EU market for an interim period of 8 years.42 This concessionary period was allowed 
in order to enable ACP countries build their capacities to withstand freer trade. At the 
end of the transition period (that is to say, commencing in 2008 and ending in 2020) 
the EU and ACP were supposed begin two way free trade arrangements which are 
WTO compatible.43 
The objectives of the Cotonou Agreement give top priority the struggle against 
poverty. It affirms the parties‟ commitment to work together towards the achievement 
of the objectives of poverty eradication, sustainable development and the gradual 
integration of the ACP countries into the world economy. To resolve this the parties 
agree to make through their cooperation a significant contribution to the economic, 
social and cultural development of the ACP countries and to the greater wellbeing of 
their population to enable these countries to face the challenges of globalisation and 
strengthen the ACP-EU partnership in the effort to give the process of globalisation a 
stronger social dimension.44 
The Agreement is based on five interdependent pillars; comprehensive political 
dimension; participatory approaches; strengthened focus on poverty reduction; 
framework for economic and trade cooperation and a framework for economic trade 
cooperation.45 
 
The first pillar which is the political dimension is recognition of a new level of maturity 
that the longstanding ACP-EU partnership has reached. This will enhance the two 
trading partners to engage in transparent political dialogue to address conflict and 
political tensions as well as peace building policies. This will contribute to peace, 
security and promote a stable and democratic political environment. 
In addition respect for human rights, democratic principles, rule of law and good 
governance provides the anchor for the dialogue based on the understanding that 
these principles are part and parcel of the long-term development. 
                                                          
42
Why EPA Negotiations? Available at http://www.acp-eu-trade.org (accessed 25 September 2010). 
43
Why EPA Negotiations? Available at http://www.acp-eu-trade.org (accessed 25 September 2010). 
44
David D „Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2000) 4. 
45
European Union „Summaries of EU Legislations: The Cotonou Agreement‟ available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/african_caribbean_pacific_states/r12101_en.htm
(accessed 19 January 2011). 
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The second pillar is participatory approach; this encourages integration of non-state 
actors or civil society organisations (CSOs) in Africa in the field of development 
cooperation. This has come as recognition of the complementary role of and 
potential for contributions by non-state actors to the development process by 
ensuring they are accorded the necessary capacity building support.46 
 
Development strategies is the third pillar; the Cotonou Agreement focuses on 
poverty eradication in ACP countries which is intended to guide development 
strategies.47 Development strategies in turn should reflect international commitments 
to end poverty as enunciated by United Nations conference and Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These strategies would be 
tailored to the individual situation of each ACP country and cooperation would 
promote local ownership of economic and social reforms.  
 
The fourth pillar is the framework for economic and trade cooperation. The objectives 
of economic and trade cooperation are to promote the smooth and gradual 
integration of the ACP countries into world economy.48 Consequently the Cotonou 
Agreement provides for negotiations of new WTO compatible trade arrangements 
removing progressively barriers to trade between them and enhancing cooperation in 
all areas relevant to trade.49 This is the focal point of the Cotonou Agreement which 
largely differentiates it from the previous Lomé Conventions. 
 
Financial cooperation is the last pillar. The objective of financial cooperation is to 
support and promote the efforts of the ACP countries to achieve the objectives set 
out in the Agreement. This support is achieved through the provision of adequate 
financial resources and appropriate technical assistance.50 The financial cooperation 
is intended to support projects, programmes and other operations in the ACP 
countries. 
 
                                                          
46
David D „Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2000)3. 
47
David D „Europe-ACP Relationship‟ (2000)3. 
48
Article 34(1) of the Cotonou Agreement. 
49
Article 36(1) of the Cotonou Agreement. 
50
Article 55 of the Cotonou Agreement. 
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The language in the Cotonou Agreement has come under criticisms to the effect that 
it reflects some element of coercion to the ACP countries. This coercion is seen in 
the EU‟s presentation of the EPAs as the only viable alternative and also through the 
implementation of frequent reviews of aid provisions that have attached conditions.51 
Hurt further contends that as much as the Cotonou Agreement is centred on the 
objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty52, these words are hollow 
and their inclusion in the text by no means guarantees their likely achievement.53 
 
The Cotonou Agreement also lacks mechanisms to address transitional problems 
that could arise from implementation of such regional Agreements such as fiscal 
reforms and private sector restructuring.54 This argument is further buttressed by the 
fact that Cotonou Agreement being the precursor of the EPAs does not contain 
mechanisms that will ensure the consistency of the proposed EPAs with different 
regional integration programs such as those enshrined in the Africa Economic 
Community Treaty.55 
 
The Cotonou Agreement lays the foundation for EPA negotiations which are a result 
of the expiration of the EU-ACP waiver in 2007. The waiver was granted to allow the 
EU and ACP countries to continue trading under an Agreement that was 
discriminatory against other WTO members in the sense that it granted preferential 
treatment to ACP countries which were not extended to other WTO members. 
Waivers are governed by the Understanding in Respect of Waivers of Obligations 
under the GATT 1994.56  Article 1 provides that: 
                                                          
51
Some of these conditions attached to aid provisions are such as respect for human rights, 
democracy and good governance in the ACP countries. These conditions also drew criticisms from 
the ACP countries during the Lomé Conventions as seen in Section 2.3 of this Thesis. For further 
reading on this see Hurt SR „Cooperation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between European 
Union and ACP States and the end of the Lomé Convention‟ (2003)
  
24 Third World Quarterly 163.
 
52
Article 34(1) of the Cotonou Agreement envisages economic and trade cooperation between the EU 
and ACP countries aimed at fostering the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP countries into 
the world economy which will eventually contribute to poverty eradication in the ACP countries. 
53
Hurt SR „Cooperation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between European Union and ACP 
States and the end of the Lomé Convention‟ (2003)
  
24 Third World Quarterly 165.
 
54
Udombana NJ „Back to Basics: The ACP-EU Cotonou Trade Agreements and Challenges for the 
African Union (2004) 49 Texas International Law Journal 22. 
55
See section 3.4 of this Thesis for a detailed a detailed analysis of the regional integration program 
as enunciated under the Africa Economic Community Treaty. 
56
Available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/11-25.pdf (accessed 1 March 2011). For a 
detailed analysis of the procedure for request for waivers see Paragraphs 3 & 4 of Article IX of the 
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. 
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A request for a waiver or for an extension of an existing waiver shall describe 
the measures which the member proposes to take, the specific policy 
objectives which the members seek to pursue and the reasons which prevent 
the member from achieving its policy objectives by measures consistent with 
its obligations under GATT 1994. 
Upon expiry of this waiver the EU could not continue granting ACP products 
preferential treatment. In addition the EU is also aware that another waiver is not an 
option going by the protracted disputes that have been presented before the WTO 
dispute settlement body. Having been presented with the foregoing scenario the EU 
and ACP had no option but negotiate a WTO compatible Agreement. In this regard 
the negotiations for a new Agreement begun in 2002.57  
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The historical background of trade relations between EU and ACP countries enables 
one to appreciate the peculiar relationship that exists between these countries 
especially taking into account the duration of its existence. This relationship has 
been beneficial to both parties and one can only hope that the new trading 
arrangement will not compromise that relationship. 
 
In addition the history brings out a key aspect of the need to have a well drafted 
Agreement which encompasses the needs of all trading partners. It is imperative that 
as the EU and ACP negotiate a new trading regime the ACP trade negotiators 
should be keen to ensure that the new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) do 
not compromise trade development and the spirit of regional integration. As will be 
clearly exhibited under section 4.4.1 of this Thesis in negotiating EPAs, the EAC 
countries should take into consideration their specific economic, social, 
environmental and structural constraints. In addition they should define policies that 
maximise benefits from further world trade liberalisation and reverse the present 
trend of marginalisation that EAC countries experience in international trade arena.58
                                                          
57
See Section 4.2 of this study for a detailed discussion on EPA. 
58
See Section 4.4 of this study for a detailed analysis of the EAC-EU EPA. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PROCESS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE TRENDS WITHIN 
THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
3.1 Introduction 
The world has witnessed the flourishing of regional agreements over the past five 
decades. This is because countries have turned to regional integration in a bid to 
strengthen their economies. Almost every country in the world is a signatory to at 
least one Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) and many are parties to multiple 
agreements.1 For most countries, regional integration is an avenue to strengthen 
their economies. However, of these only a few such as the European Union (EU) as 
seen in Section 2.2 of this study can be considered to have achieved impressive 
progress in achieving their goals. Some have done better than others in improving 
regional integration thereby benefitting their citizens. 
The establishment of the Africa Economic Community 2(AEC) led to emergence of 
regional groupings throughout Africa. However, for Africa to reap from the process of 
regional integration these groups must live up to their objectives and a concrete 
foundation must be laid for them to succeed.3 
The East African Community (EAC) is negotiating the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) with European Union (EU) hereinafter EU-EAC EPA as a regional 
block. This is because the member countries appreciate the strength that countries 
draw in negotiating as a bloc as opposed to an individual country and particularly 
where the other party is stronger economically as is the case with the EU. 
Furthermore critics of EPAs have argued that EPAs will undermine the spirit of 
regional integration in Africa, it is thus imperative to look at the process of regional 
integration. 
                                                          
1
The long period taken in multilateral negotiations is said to be a contributing factor for countries to 
engage in regional trade agreements since negotiations at regional level taken a shorter period.  
2
The AEC was established in 1991 based on the final Act of Lagos and the Treaty is commonly known 
as the Abuja Treaty. See „AEC: History and present status‟ available at 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/multilateral/africa.aec.htm (accessed 9 March 2011). 
3
 See Section 3.3.1 of this study on the benefits of regional integration. 
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In light of the foregoing, this Chapter seeks to examine the process of regional 
integration and its benefits. The history of the EAC will be examined and the last 
section will seek to discuss the effects of regional integration on intra-African trade.4 
3.2 Definitions of Regional Integration 
Various definitions of regional integration have been fronted by many scholars. 
Carim describes regional integration as follows; 
A condition (or process) wherein separate national economies maintain (or 
progressively) lower barriers to mutual trade while sustaining relatively higher 
barriers to third parties.5 
Bischoff defines regional integration as; 
A process where a group of states voluntarily and to various extent get access to 
each other‟s markets and establish mechanisms and techniques that minimise and 
maximise the internal market and external economic, social, political and cultural 
profits of their co-operation.6 
On the other hand World Trade Organisation (WTO) envisages regional integration 
to occur in instances where an RTA is undertaken by countries located within a 
defined geographical area whereby the participating countries align themselves with 
each other for the purpose of achieving a pre-determined form of economic 
integration.7 
However while this is the case, there have been instances where countries not 
belonging to the same region enter into a regional agreement a case in point being 
the EPAs with the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. This seems to be 
the scenario propelled by Parthapratim when he defined RTAs as groupings of 
countries which are formed with the objective of reducing barriers to trade with 
member countries. Parthapratim contends that contrary to what the name suggests, 
                                                          
4
Intra-African trade is trade conducted amongst the African countries and more so within the various 
regional blocs in Africa for example trade between the East African Community (EAC) and Common 
Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) can be describes as intra-African trade. 
5
Carim X „Multilateral Trading, Regional Integration and Southern African Development Community‟    
(2005) 65 The South Africa Journal of Economics 336. 
6
Karlsson C „Regionalism from Outside: The EU Foreign Aid Policy and Regional Integration‟ (2006) 
12 available at http://www.accord.org.za/ct/1992-2/ct2_ (accessed 15 January 2011). 
7
See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (accessed 2 February 2011). 
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these groupings or unions may be concluded between countries not necessarily 
belonging to the same geographical region.8 
Going by the various definitions it would seem that elimination of trade barriers 
amongst trading partners is very vital in deepening trade relations for purposes of 
regional integration. Integration measures have extended their reach beyond 
traditional free trade in goods to a number of domestic regulatory sphere including 
services, investments and intellectual property rights with a view to deepening the 
integration among member countries. Regional integration has gained a renewed 
dynamism and is no doubt here to stay as an element of the broader trading system. 
3.3 Stages of Regional Integration 
Regional integration arrangements take different forms. A common method used for 
classifying different types of regional integration is to focus on the degree of 
integration.9 
Preferential Trade Area: This is an arrangement in which members impose lower 
tariffs on imports produced by members than to imports produced by non-members. 
Members can determine tariffs on imports from non-members.10 
Free Trade Area: This is usually the second stage of integration. This is a 
preferential trade area where parties agree to remove trade barriers between 
themselves with each party maintaining its own external tariff. Parties choose this 
mode where their economic structures are complimentary. An example of this in 
Africa is the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).11 
Customs Union: Here members remove barriers to trade between themselves, 
have a common external tariff for non-members and may cede sovereignty to a 
single customs administration. This is often adopted by parties that are competitive. 
The EAC is a good reference on this since its customs union is in full force.12 
                                                          
8
Parthapratim, P „Regional Trade Agreements in a Multilateral Trade Regime: An Overview‟ available 
at http://www.networkideas.org/feathm/may2004/survey_paper_RTA.pdf (accessed 1 February 2011). 
9
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa „Assessing Regional Integration in Africa‟ (2004) 22 
(hereafter UNECA). 
10
UNECA (2004) 22. 
11
UNECA (2004) 22. 
12
UNECA (2004) 22. 
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Common Market: This is a customs union that allows free movement of factors of 
production such as capital and labour across national borders within the integration 
area. The common market for the EAC was launched on 30th June 2010 though the 
member countries are still working on harmonising laws especially with regard to free 
movement of persons across national borders to make it fully functional. However, 
much progress has been reported by the member countries.13 
Economic and Monetary Union: This is a common market with unified monetary 
and fiscal policies, including a common currency and economic policies are 
integrated into the member countries. EU would be the best example of such a 
union.14 
Political Union: This is the ultimate stage of integration in which members become 
one nation. National governments cede sovereignty over economic and social 
policies to a supranational authority establishing common institutions and judicial and 
legislative processes including a common parliament.15 In Africa none of the current 
regional block has attained this level of integration. Again the EU is a good example 
of a successful political union. 
Countries can start with any of these arrangements but most begin by removing 
impediments to trade amongst themselves and then introduce deeper and wider 
integration mechanisms. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) lists eight regional blocks16 of the African Economic Community (AEC) 
which are at different levels of integration however, this is not without consideration 
of the many regional blocks already in existence. 
3.3.1 Benefits of Regional Integration 
With increased proliferation in the number of regional integration arrangements the 
natural question that follows is why do countries join regional integration 
                                                          
13
„Accessing the Progress in the Common Market‟ Jumuiya News 15 September 2010 issue No. 15 
available at http://www.meac.go.ke (accessed 8 February 2011). 
14
UNECA (2004) 22. 
15
UNECA (2004) 22. 
16
The eight regional blocks of the African Economic Community are: Economic Community of 
Western Africa (ECOWAS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic 
Community for Central African States (ECCAS), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), 
The East African Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority Development (IGAD), Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU) and Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). 
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arrangements? And to what extent do such arrangements achieve their goals? 
According to study by UNECA among the benefits that countries derive from regional 
integration are gains from new trade opportunities, larger markets and increased 
competition.17 In essence it would thus be true to conclude that the process of 
regional integration enhances trade amongst the member partners as a result of 
increased market access. 
Regional integration has the effect of creating trade as well as diverting trade. The 
EU has demonstrated that if managed well regional integration arrangements can 
lead to income convergence. For instance countries like Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
have made progress closing the gap with richer EU members. In the mid-1980s per 
capita incomes in these three countries ranged from 27 per cent to 61 per cent of the 
average income of large EU countries. By the late 1990s they ranged from 38 per 
cent to 91 per cent.18 
In addition regional integration makes it easier for countries to achieve their set trade 
goals as they are faster to negotiate since they usually involve a few number of 
participant countries unlike in the multilateral negotiations where the number of 
countries involved is large and there must be consensus.19 
Regional integration enhances power bargaining of the member countries. Increase 
in power bargaining as a result of banding together through regional integration is 
indisputable. This has clearly been demonstrated by the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) and developing countries at the multilateral level. A good example in this 
regard is the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) which has attained a degree of 
visibility that no single member could have hoped to attain individually.20 
Regional integrations have also helped to reduce conflicts between its members. 
This is because when countries agree to form a regional bloc element of trust comes 
into play which in turn facilitates cooperation. A case in point is the conflict between 
Kenya and Uganda over Migingo Island in Lake Victoria which is at the border of 
Kenya and Uganda. Both countries opted to sort out the conflict amicably for the 
                                                          
17
UNECA (2004) 22. 
18
UNECA (2004) 23. 
19
As seen in Section 3.1 of this study this has led to proliferation of regional trade agreements. 
20
Schiff M „Regional Integration and Development in Small States‟ Development Research Group, 
The World Bank available at http://www.worlbank.org (accessed 12 January 2011). 
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sake of the EAC integration.21 A World Bank report suggests that increased trade 
between two countries lowers the risk of conflict between them by about 17 per 
cent.22 This analogy could be true especially having regard to the reason behind the 
formation of the European Community (now EU) which was formed to end war 
between the community members. 
Lastly, as a result of regional integration countries tend to specialise where they 
have comparative advantage in different areas of production. This is especially 
where countries have vastly different economic structures. Specialisation enables 
countries to concentrate in production of one or more types of goods and this leads 
to enhanced quality of goods as well as low prices which benefits the member 
countries. 
3.3.2 Disadvantages of Regional Integration 
However, much as regional integration seems to offer the most incredible strategy 
for tackling Africa‟s development challenges, internally and externally the same has 
not been without reproach. One of the glaring disadvantages is the multiplicity of the 
RTAs. According to UNECA out of the 53 African countries, 26 are members of two 
regional economic communities and 20 are members of three regional economic 
communities.23 One country (Democratic Republic of Congo) belongs to four 
communities and only six countries maintain membership in just one regional 
community.24 This has resulted to overlapping membership which further results in 
counterproductive competition. 
As a result various conflicting regimes of rules for example rules of origin are initiated 
and this creates obstacles to trade facilitation by increasing administrative cost of 
doing business in any one nation as businessmen may find themselves having to 
comply with different requirements depending on where they are exporting goods 
to.25 Oduro observes that “it is difficult to envisage how SADC and COMESA given 
                                                          
21
Ministry of East African Community Kenya „Migingo Conflict and what it means to EAC Integration‟ 
Jumuiya News Issue 15 July-September (2009) 16. 
22
Schiff M & Alan W „Regional Integration and Development‟ World Bank Report (2003) available at 
http://www.worldbank.org (accessed 24 February 2011). 
23
UNECA (2004) 50. 
24
UNECA (2004) 50. 
25
Commission on Trade and Investment Policy Report „Regional Trade Agreements and the 
Multilateral Trade System‟ (2002) available at http://www.icc.org (accessed 4 February 2011). 
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their convergence to both sectoral and trade integration can live and prosper with the 
overlapping membership of the Southern African countries.”26 
Moreover in the process of eliminating trade barriers amongst trading partners for 
example eliminating or reducing tariffs in a Free Trade Area (FTA), this can lead to 
substantial loss of revenue especially for countries that heavily depend on customs 
revenue as a major source of income.27 
RTAs are an exception to the most favoured nation principle of the WTO and as 
such are by their very nature discriminatory agreements. Viner challenges the view 
that RTAs can only lead to trade creation and asserts that they can also lead to trade 
diversion. This can happen where members switch imports from low cost producers 
in non-members to high cost producers. He observes that; 
….where the trade diverting effect is predominant one at least of the members is 
bound to be injured, the two combined will suffer net injury and there will be injury to 
the outside world at large.28 
3.4 Development of Regional Economic Integration in Africa 
The establishment of the AEC29 marked the beginning of regional groupings in 
Africa. Throughout this process regional groupings emerged through Africa. 
According to a study by UNECA integration in Africa was as a result of several 
reasons;30 First that the integration was politically motivated. The African continent 
like other continents has had its share of political tension. The need for countries to 
appease the situation and end conflicts amongst countries led to the need for 
integration.  
The second reason was for economic appraisal in most countries. Regional 
integration was seen as an avenue to strengthen economies in the member 
countries. An economically powerful country could uplift the economy of a weaker 
member by pooling resources and share in benefits. Lastly geographical positioning 
                                                          
26
UNECA (2004) 50. 
27
See Section 4.5 of this study on how the intended free trade area which will be created as a result of 
the EAC-EU EPA will lead to loss of revenue for EAC countries upon elimination of trade barriers. 
28
 Viner JThe Customs Union Issue (1950) 4. 
29
The AEC was established in 1991 based on the Final Act of Lagos and the commonly referred to as 
the Abuja Treaty. „AEC: History and Present Status‟ available at  
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/aec.htm (Accessed 8 February 2011). 
30
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa „Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV: Intra-
African Trade (2010) 14 (hereafter UNECA IV). 
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played a major role in regional integration. Most countries that belong to a certain 
regional bloc more often share common geographical boundaries. This can be seen 
in regional blocs such as EAC, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) and SADC. 
Article 6 of the AEC Treaty outlines the objectives of the AEC while highlighting the 
six stages of integration over a period of 34 years.31 These stages incorporate 
existing Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and provide for the establishment 
of any future REC. The stages are as follows: 
Stage One: This was slated for five years and during this stage the AEC aimed to 
strengthen the existing RECs and establish new RECs.32 
Stage Two: During this stage, eight years were set aside to establish tariff and non-
tariff barriers, customs duties and internal taxes at the level of each REC. In addition 
at this stage AEC was to harmonize the activities of the REC and strengthen 
integration in various sectors. This stage was completed in 2007.33 
Stage Three:  This stage was slated for ten years in which AEC aimed to set up free 
trade areas for the gradual removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers and a custom 
union in the RECs by means of adopting a common external tariff. This stage is set 
to be completed in 2017.34 
Stage Four: This stage was scheduled for two years and the main goal here was to 
coordinate and harmonise tariff and non-tariff barriers among the RECs with the 
ultimate goal of establishing a continental customs union.35 
Stage Five: Stage five was given four years and the main goal was to establish an 
African common market.36 
Stage Six: This being the final stage consisted of establishing a single domestic 
market, a central bank, currency and parliament. The vision here was end up with a 
fully integrated block like what the EU has become today.37 
                                                          
31
UNECA IV (2010) 16. 
32
UNECA IV (2010) 16. 
33
UNECA IV (2010) 16. 
34
UNECA IV (2010) 16. 
35
UNECA IV (2010) 16. 
36
UNECA IV (2010) 16. 
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However the pace of implementing the six stages of integration as highlighted in 
Article 6 of the AEC Treaty varies from one REC to another. All the RECs in Africa 
have launched FTA with the exception of the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD).38 
Having looked at the process and development of regional economic integration in 
Africa the next section hereunder will examine the history of the EAC which is the 
main focus of this study. 
3.5 History of the EAC 
3.5.1 From Co-operation to Community  
One of the earliest attempts at integration on the African continent occurred in East 
Africa.39 The roots of the EAC have been traced as far back as 1902 when an 
administrative organisation was established to foster British interests in Tanganyika 
and the Zanzibar Protectorate (now Tanzania), the Uganda Protectorate and the 
Colony of Kenya.40 The British used this early version of the EAC to regulate trade, 
transportation, and communication within Kenya. In 1948, the British colonial 
administration created the East African High Commission (EAHC) to serve largely 
the same ends.41 These early common market structures enabled Great Britain to 
easily exploit the colonies.42 The colonial administration gave Kenya a position of 
predominance, and most of the major industries in East Africa were located in 
Nairobi.43 This led to uneven levels of development not only in the industrial sector, 
but in the service and trade sectors as well.44 Thus Kenya became the "centre of the 
periphery" in East Africa, while the economic structures of Kenya, Uganda, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
37
UNECA IV (2010) 16. 
38
UNECA IV (2010) 16. 
39
Fitzke S „The Treaty for East African Co-operation: Can East Africa Successfully Revive one of 
Africa‟s Most Infamous Economic Groupings?‟ (1999) 8 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 127. 
40
Aggrey A „Seeking Regional Economic Co-operation in Africa‟ (1992) 46 Journal of Internal Affairs 
119, 120. 
41
The Treaty establishing East African Co-operation 1967 available at http://www.eac.int/organs 
(accessed 3 February 2011) 
42
Okoth PG „The Foreign Policy of Uganda since Independence towards Kenya and Tanzania in 
Politics and Administration in East Africa 3 ed (1994) 359,361 (hereafter The Foreign Policy of 
Uganda). 
43
Okoth PG „The Foreign Policy of Uganda’ (1994) 365. 
44
Adar KG & Ngunyi M „The Politics of Integration in East Africa since Independence in Politics and 
Administration in East Africa’ (1996) 395, 412. 
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Tanzania became intertwined and interdependent.45 
 
In the post-colonial era, the close ties between Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania 
remained intact because the countries' leaders realized that losing the common 
market structures that had been built during the colonial period would be costly.46 In 
1967, the three countries entered into a Treaty formally establishing the EAC.47 
Although the main focus of the Treaty was economic, it went further than all previous 
Agreements in the area by undertaking to integrate the politics, as well as the 
common services, of the member countries.48 
 
The stated goal of the Treaty for East African Co-operation was regional integration 
and Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania all publicly espoused the notion that they entered 
the Treaty for mutual gain. However, in truth, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania were all 
seeking to protect their own varying national interests. While administered by Great 
Britain, the Kenyan economy had become dependent on foreign capital.49 
 
Therefore, after independence, in order to maintain its prominence within the region, 
Kenya needed to retain export outlets for its goods and services. Tanzania, which 
viewed itself as a net loser under the previous trading scheme, sought to achieve a 
more balanced division of the gains from trade within the region. Tanzania also had 
an ideological commitment to African unity50 and saw the EAC as a stepping stone 
toward pan-Africanism.51 Finally Uganda supported the EAC because it wanted to 
formalize its relationship with Kenya. Due to its landlocked position, Uganda was 
dependent on Kenyan ports and Uganda wanted freer access to the Kenyan market 
for its agricultural products. In addition, Uganda, like Tanzania, wanted to improve its 
                                                          
45
Okoth PG ‘The Foreign Policy of Uganda’ (1994) 36. 
46
Green RH ‘The East African Community: A Valediction Forbidding Mourning‟ (1978) 8. 
47
The Treaty for East African Co-operation 1967 available at http://www,eac.int/ (accessed 12 
February 2011). 
48
See the Treaty for East African Co-operation, the preamble of the Treaty states that „in their desire 
for the wider unity of Africa (the three countries) are resolved to co-operate with one another and with 
other African countries in the economic, political and cultural fields‟. However despite this broad policy 
statement, the leaders of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania could not reach an agreement on political 
federation and nothing further was discussed in the Treaty about how the three countries planned to 
integrate their politics beyond the proposed economic co-operation. 
49
Okoth PG „The Foreign Policy of Uganda’ (1994) 364. 
50
Okoth PG „The Foreign Policy of Uganda‟ (1994) 364. 
51
Green RH „The East African Community: A Valediction Forbidding Mourning’ (1978) 3. 
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overall position within the region and achieve more equality in the distribution of 
benefits from trade and industry within the region.52 
 
However unfortunately this co-operation only lasted for ten years and in 1977 the 
community collapsed. Several reasons have been fronted as the root cause for the 
collapse. A report53 by the EAC Secretariat identifies such reasons to include; intra-
community political differences; differences on the sharing from jointly owned 
common services organisations and lack of policy to redress the situation; low 
private sector and civil society input in the running of the then community; the then 
west/east divide polarising the world into capitalist and socialists which resulted in 
disparate economic systems of socialism in Tanzania and capitalism in Kenya. In 
addition others have observed that demands by Kenya for more seats than Uganda 
and Tanzania in decision making organs could have caused the collapse as well as 
persistent disagreements with Ugandan dictator Idi Amin with the other Heads of 
States.54 
 
3.5.2 Revival of the Community 
 
Following the dissolution of the former EAC in 1977, the member states negotiated a 
Mediation Agreement for the division of assets and liabilities which they signed in 
1984. However as one of the provisions of the Mediation Agreement, the three states 
agreed to explore areas for future co-operation and to make concrete arrangements 
for such co-operation.55 
 
Subsequent meetings of the three Heads of States led to the signing of the 
Agreement for the Establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East 
African Co-operation on 30 November 1993. Full East African Co-operation 
operations started on 14 March 1996 when the Secretariat of the Permanent 
Tripartite Commission was launched at the headquarters of the EAC in Arusha, 
Tanzania. 
                                                          
52
Fitzke S „The Treaty for East African Co-operation‟ (1999) 8 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 136. 
53
East African Community Secretariat „Present and Future Trends of the East African Community‟ 
(2005) 7 available at http://www.eac.int (accessed 3 February 2011). 
54
Peterson TL „Born in Anonymity‟ Mshikamano Magazine 10 April 2005.  
55
History of the East African Community available at http://www.eac.int/about-eac/eac-history.html 
(accessed 9 February 2011). 
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Considering the need to consolidate regional co-operation, the East African Heads of 
State at their 2nd Summit in Arusha on 29 April 1997, directed the Permanent 
Tripartite Commission to start the process of upgrading the Agreement establishing 
the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-operation into a Treaty.56 
 
The Treaty-making process, which involved negotiations among the member 
countries as well as wide participation of the public, was successfully concluded 
within three years.57 The Treaty for Establishment of the EAC was signed on 30 
November 1999 and entered into force on 7 July 2000 following its ratification with 
the Secretary General by the original three Partner States – Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania. The Republic of Rwanda and the Republic of Burundi acceded to the EAC 
Treaty on 18 June 2007 and became full Members of the Community with effect from 
1 July 2007. Upon the entry into force of the Treaty, the EAC came into being.58 
 
3.5.3 The Newly Integrated EAC 
 
The main goal of the EAC as an economic and political entity is to improve the 
standard of living of the population through increased competitiveness value-added 
production, trade and investment. It tends to promote sustainable development and 
foster a prosperous internationally competitive, stable and politically united region.59 
 
The vision of the EAC is a prosperous, competitive, secure, stable and politically 
united East Africa. Its mission is to widen and deepen Economic, Political, Social and 
Culture integration in order to improve the quality of life of the people of East Africa 
through increased competitiveness, value added production, trade and 
investments.60 
The EAC's core values are: professionalism: accountability; transparency; teamwork; 
unity in diversity; allegiance to the EAC ideals. 
                                                          
56
History of the East African Community available at http://www.eac.int/about-eac/eac-history.html 
(accessed 9 February 2011). 
57
Green RH „The East African Community: A Valediction Forbidding Mourning’ (1978) 2. 
58
History of the East African Community available at http://www.eac.int/about-eac/eac-history.html 
(accessed 9 February 2011). 
59
UNECA IV (2010) 16. 
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 East African Community Secretariat „Present and Future Trends of the East African Community‟ 
(2005) 7 available at http://www.eac.int (accessed 3 February 2011).  
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The EAC‟s objectives are provided for in Article 3 of the EAC Treaty.61 They are as 
follows: 
a) Attainment of sustainable growth and development of the partner 
states by the promotion of a more balanced and harmonious 
development of the Partner States; 
b) Strengthening and consolidation of co-operation in agreed fields that 
enhance equitable economic development within the Partner States; 
c) Promotion of sustainable utilisation of the natural resources of the 
partner states and effective protection of the natural environment; 
d) Strengthening and consolidation of the long standing political, 
economic, social, cultural and traditional ties and association among 
the people of the Region; 
e) Mainstreaming of gender in all its endeavours and the enhancement of 
the role of women in cultural, social, political, economic and 
technological development; 
f) Promotion of peace, security and stability within the region; 
g) Enhancement and strengthening of partnerships with the private sector 
and civil society for sustainable socio-economic and political 
development; 
h) Undertaking of such other activities calculated to further the objectives 
of the Community as the Partner States may from time to time decide 
to undertake in common. 
 
The EAC aims at widening and deepening co-operation among the partner States in, 
among others, political, economic and social fields for their mutual benefit.62 To this 
end in 2005 the EAC countries established a Customs Union63.  On 30 June 2010 
the EAC launched its Common Market in 2010 and is now working towards a 
Monetary Union which is scheduled for 2012 and ultimately a Political Federation of 
the East African States.64 
                                                          
61
Available at http://www.eac.int/organs.html (accessed 3 February 2011). 
62
About EAC available at http://www.eac.int/about-eac.html (accessed 3 February 2011). 
63
The Customs Union was established pursuant to Article 75 of the Treaty establishing the East 
African Community. 
64
About EAC available at http://www.eac.int/about-eac.htl (accessed 3 February 2011). 
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The realisation of a large regional economic bloc encompassing Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda with a combined population of more than 125 million 
people, land area of 1.82 million sq. kilometres and a combined Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of $73 billion (2009), bears great strategic and geopolitical 
significance and prospects of a renewed and reinvigorated EAC.65 
 
The regional integration process is at a high pitch at the moment as reflected by the 
encouraging progress of the East African Customs Union, the signing in November 
2009 and ratification in 2010 of the Common Market Protocol by all the Partner 
States.66 
 
3.5.4 The EAC in the Trading Sphere 
The EU continues to be the EAC‟s largest trading partner accounting for 19.9 per 
cent in 2009 compared with 18.4 per cent recorded in 2008.67 Regional trade 
integration is a cornerstone of EAC Partner States‟ trade policies. To this end the 
EAC has been involved in strengthening of public institutions and private sector 
organisations involved in export promotion. Private sector has been at the forefront 
of enhancing economic growth and has absorbed most of low-income earners 
population thereby creating employment opportunities especially for the youth. In 
Kenya the horticultural sector has greatly boosted the economy and has been hailed 
as one of the key drivers of the economy after tourism sector.68 
Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda are covered by the EU‟s Everything But 
Arms69 (EBA) initiative, under which all products from LDCs except arms and 
ammunitions have preferential access to the EU market. Together with other sub-
Saharan African countries, the EAC partner states also qualify for duty-free access 
to the United States‟ market under the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
                                                          
65
See Section 4.3 of this study on the trade statistics between the EU and the EAC. Also available at 
http://www.eac.int/about-eac.html (accessed 3 February 2011). 
66
About EAC available at http://www.eac.int/about-eac.html (accessed 3 February 2011). 
67
EAC trade statistics available at http://www.eac.int/trade/index (accessed 5 February 2011). 
68
Export Processing Zone Report „Horticulture Industry in Kenya‟ (2005) available at 
http://www.epzakenya.com/UserFiles/File/Horticulture.pdf (accessed 10 February 2011). 
69
EBA Regulation grants duty-free access to imports of all products from LDCs to the EU market, 
except arms and ammunitions without any quantitative restrictions (with the exception of sugar, 
bananas and rice for a limited period). Available at http://www.ec.europa.eu/trade (accessed 19 
October 2010).  
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(AGOA).70 
Products from EAC countries can access various markets in the developed world 
through the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)71 which offers preferential 
treatment to a wide range of products originating in developing countries. However 
the EAC has not been without challenges and much needs to be done especially by 
encouraging other players such as private sector in the trading sphere. 
3.5.5 Trade challenges within the EAC 
Like most African and developing world the EAC has not been spared by the 
harrowing effects of the prevailing unfavourable terms of trade.72 The EAC is a net 
importer that is, it imports twice as much as it exports or consumes twice as much as 
it produces in trade value terms. EAC countries export mainly primary unprocessed 
products and imports mainly finished consumer and capital goods.73 
The leading economic activities of the EAC member states today are agriculture 
which contributes an average of 39 per cent of GDP and provides employment to 85 
per cent of the population; tourism which contributes an average of 14 per cent of 
GDP with investments worth US $ 3 230 million and manufacturing which contributes 
an average of 10.4 per cent of GDP with investments worth US $ 2 131 million.74 
Going by the foregoing statics it is clear that agriculture is the major economic 
activity within the EAC accounting for three quarters of the employment level and 
hence cautious steps must be taken especially while liberalising this sector to major 
trading partners as will be seen in the Section 4.5 of this study. In addition the EAC 
needs to explore other areas in the service sector which can enhance the tourism 
sector. It is thus evident that a great deal more effort must be applied to boost the 
region‟s industrial and manufacturing sector as well as the service sector so as to 
enhance trade development within the EAC. Moreover EAC needs to move away 
                                                          
70
EAC trade statistics available at http://www.eac.int/trade/index (accessed 5 February 2011). 
71
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is a scheme whereby selected products originating 
in developing countries are granted reduced or zero tariff rates over the most favoured nation rates. 
The least developed countries (LDCs) receive special and preferential treatment for a wider coverage 
of products and deeper tariff cuts. The objectives of the GSP scheme are to increase export earning, 
promote industrialization and accelerate rates of economic growth of these countries. Available at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=1(accessed 9 February 2011). 
72
UNECA IV (2010) 17. 
73
EAC trade statistics available at http://www.eac.int/trade/index (accessed 5 February 2011). 
74
EAC trade statistics available at http://www.eac.int/trade/index (accessed 5 February 2011). 
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from the cocoon of agriculture sector for it to compete effectively in international 
trading sphere. 
3.5.6 Trade Development within the EAC 
According to a trade report by the EAC secretariat there has been steady level of 
growth in trade within EAC since 2005.75  This has been attributed to commitment by 
member countries in implementation of the trade reforms nationally and within the 
region. However, the member countries are at consensus that much is needed to 
improve the level of trade within the EAC for the region to compete globally. To this 
end the EAC countries have come up with a number of initiatives to enhance trade 
and these include the following: 
The first initiative is with regard to ratification of the Protocol establishing the East 
African Customs Union which was signed in March 2004.76 The Protocol came into 
force upon ratification by the then three EAC member countries and became 
effective on 1 January 2005. The objectives of the Customs Union include furthering 
the liberalisation of intra-regional trade in goods; promoting production efficiency in 
the Community; enhancing domestic, cross-border and foreign investment; and 
promoting economic development and industrial diversification.  
The Protocol establishing the EAC guides the implementation process of the 
customs union along with other instruments. The underpinning role of the Protocol 
establishing the East African Customs Union includes removal of the customs duties 
and charges of equivalent effects on internal trade, elimination of all non-tariff 
barriers77 to trade (NTBs) and establishment and maintaining a common external 
tariff (CET).  
The implementation of the customs union has resulted in the harmonisation and 
uniform application of the EAC customs laws in the member countries, uniform 
application of the CET, asymmetrical reduction of internal tariff as envisaged in the 
                                                          
75
EAC Trade Report (2009) 12 available at http://www.eac.int/statistics/ (accessed 12 February 2011). 
76
Wolfe B Regional Integration in Africa: Lessons from the East African Community (2008) 63 South 
African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). 
77
Article 13 of the Protocol for the establishment of the East African Community Customs Union 
defines NTBs as quantitative restrictions and specific limitations that act as obstacles to trade other 
than tariffs. These barriers may be embedded in laws, regulations, practices and requirements at the 
national level mostly applied at the customs border for various legitimate levels like revenue 
collection, safeguarding health and environment. 
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Protocol as well as progressive removal of the NTBs which has remained a major 
challenge to trade within the EAC. This has greatly contributed towards intra-regional 
trade especially with regard to investment and this has boosted the level of trade in 
the member countries. 
Secondly the member countries have greatly improved in trade facilitation.78 The 
member countries have agreed to cooperate in simplifying, standardising and 
harmonising trade information and documentation so as to facilitate trade in goods. 
One of the improved areas is in relation to anti-dumping measures where the 
Community has developed anti-dumping regulations, as elaborately highlighted in 
the EAC Customs Union Protocol.79 
Enactment of Competition Policy and Law80 is another initiative that has greatly 
improved the level of trade within EAC. The enacted EAC Competition Policy and 
Law which is already being implemented by the member countries aims to deter any 
malpractice that adversely affects free trade within the Community. This is to ensure 
that the countries engage in fair competition with each other which is vital for 
economic growth. 
Fourthly all goods that are re-exported are to be exempted from the payment of 
import or export duties. This initiative is geared towards encouraging members to re-
export goods and this has subsequently increased intra-regional trade.81 
Another step is towards removal of non-tariff barriers to trade.82 Under Article 13 of 
the Customs Union Protocol, the EAC member countries have agreed to remove all 
existing non-tariff barriers to trade and not to impose any new ones. 
Lastly member countries have taken an initiative in the area of standards and 
                                                          
78
UNECA IV (2010) 203. 
79
EAC Trade Report (2009) 12 available at http://www.eac.int/statistics/ (accessed 12 February 2011). 
80
The East African Community Competition Act of 2001 was enacted to promote and protect fair 
competition, provide consumer welfare and to establish the EAC Competition Authority. Full text of the 
Act is available at http://www.eac.int/trade/ (accessed 10 February 2011). 
81
Market Size, Access and Trade Policies within East African Community available at 
http://www.eac.int/trade/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50:trade-info&catid=36:ntbs 
(accessed 3 February 2011). 
82
Article 13 of the Protocol for the establishment of East African Community Customs Union defines 
non-tariff barriers as quantitative restrictions and specific limitations that act as obstacles to trade, 
other tariffs. These barriers may be in form of laws, regulations, practices and requirements mostly 
applied at the borders. These barriers are often for various legitimate reasons like revenue collection, 
safeguarding health and environment. 
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measures. Under Article 81 of the Treaty Establishing the Community, the EAC 
member countries recognise the importance of standardisation, quality assurance, 
metrology and testing for the promotion of trade and investment and consumer 
protection, among other things. The development of East African Standards has 
been necessitated by the need for harmonising requirements governing quality of 
products and services in the EAC.83 It is envisaged that through harmonised 
standardisation, trade barriers which are encountered when goods and services are 
exchanged within the community will be removed.  
3.6 Intra-African Trade 
With the proliferation of the number in regional integration, it therefore follows that 
the level of intra-African trade is elevated. In this regard it is imperative to look at 
intra-trade with regard to Africa. 
Intra-regional trade flows in Africa have been generally low compared with other 
regions, primarily because of poor infrastructural development, maintenance and 
connectivity, conflicts and security issues among the regions and the presence of 
trade barriers. Poor infrastructure has contributed to low trade, internal airways are 
insufficiently exploited and in most cases underdeveloped, making it difficult to 
conduct intra-continental business. Therefore there is need to develop linkage 
among African regions in order to improve movement of goods and services. 
3.6.1 Benefits of Intra-African Trade 
It is without doubt that many African countries have greatly benefited and continue to 
benefit from intra-African trade.84 Intra-African trade contributes to enlarged regional 
markets providing incentives for private cross-border investments and region foreign 
direct investment.  In addition expanded intra-African trade should generate faster 
growth and income convergence in regional economic communities.  
                                                          
83
The East African Standards are prepared by the East African Standards Committee (EASC) 
established in accordance with Section 4 of the East African Community Standardisation, Quality 
Assurance, Metrology and Testing Act of 2006. The committee brings together the national bureaux of 
standards of the EAC member countries that is Bureau Burundais de Normalisation et Contrôle de la 
Qualité (BBN), Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS), Rwanda Bureau of Standards (RBS), Tanzania 
Bureau of Standards (TBS) and Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS). 
84
UNECA IV (2010) 89. 
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As result of intra-African trade many countries have become economically 
dependent in that the trade weakens the long-term dependence of African countries 
on developed market economies for manufacturers.85 This is because as a result of 
intra-African trade production structures are diversified away from production and 
trade of primary commodities. 
Facilitating and promoting trade requires not only removing tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers but also simplifying trade and lowering the cost of doing business. Such 
efforts also promote competitiveness in regional and global markets because they 
shorten delivery times and cut costs, lowering the price of goods. The theory that 
trade is positively correlated with economic growth seeks to embrace arguments by 
Adam Smith who observed that trade allows for increased specialisation.86 A 
country‟s abundant means of production also is fully exploited through trade. The 
experience of China and India in the past two decades has been resoundingly 
consistent with the diagnosis that opening trade to the world economy fosters 
productivity and economic growth.87 In this regard one can only hope that Africa will 
continue to further liberalise its market both in the goods and services sector which 
will in turn foster economic growth.  
However, it is paramount for governments to understand how trade policies work 
including non-tariff barriers such as licenses and permits affect the economy. Policy 
makers should understand the structure of the tariff including its dispersion, 
exemptions and rebates; revenues derived from tariffs; what export goods must be 
taxed or subsidised, whether trade related institutions such as standard 
organisations, export finance and marketing facilities are adequate to support export 
expansion and the protectionist policies that favour and assist the poor during 
transition.88 
3.7 Conclusion 
The process of establishing regional integration is a steady process that requires 
cooperation and contribution by all partner states for good results to be achieved. 
Developing and least developed countries in Africa have become active participants 
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UNECA IV (2010) 39. 
86
UNECA IV (2010) 40. 
87
Bilal S „Redefining ACP-EU Trade Relations: Economic Partnership Agreements‟ (2006) 12. 
88
UNECA IV (2010) 42. 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
in the regional integration process. These countries see regional integration as an 
essential avenue towards economic growth, development and poverty alleviation. 
Regional integration if properly structured can be a tool for promoting economic 
growth and sustainable development and improving the living standards of the 
African people. In addition Regional integration accomplishes common objectives 
that encourage economic transformation in areas such as trade, customs union, 
common markets and economic union. However, the same can result in 
counterproductive competition in cases of overlapping memberships. 
Intra-African trade holds the key to unlocking Africa‟s potential growth and if highly 
encouraged the continent can seize the opportunity to become economically stable. 
More so intra-African trade is necessary for Africa to sustain the growth that is being 
fuelled by rapidly increasing exposure to other emerging markets 
One of the emerging issues in this chapter is that for African countries to benefit from 
regional integration they must design integration arrangements suited to their needs. 
To increase regional trade and investment it is thus imperative that African countries 
liberalise and streamline existing RTAs. In addition countries need to work on their 
policy issues to ensure a positive contribution of regional integration to their 
economic development. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EAST AFRICAN 
COMMUNITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION   
4.1 Introduction 
As noted in Section 2.2 of this study Economic Partnership Agreements1 (EPAs) are 
an evolution of long historical ties between Europe and African Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries.2 In June 2000 the 77 ACP countries and the 15 member 
states of the European Union (EU) signed a new Partnership Agreement the 
Cotonou Agreement establishing a new framework for the relationship between ACP 
countries and the EU. The Cotonou Agreement establishes a clear departure in 
ACP-EU economic relations from the previous 25 years of non-reciprocal preferential 
trade relations under four successful Lomé Conventions. 
Every country regardless of its size, ideology or state of development participates in 
international trade because every country can gain from international trade. The 
advantages of trade are so compelling that even countries with a strong ideology 
favouring autarky actively participate in world markets. However, what determines 
whether the country gets to gain from such trade are the terms of the trade 
Agreement and the negotiating capacity of the country. These two factors enable the 
trade negotiators to couch the Agreement in a way that reflects the interest of its 
country. Herein lays the fear amongst East African Community member countries 
that some of the provisions of the EAC-EU EPA do not reflect best interest of the 
EAC as far as its trade development is concerned.  
The history of trade relations between EU and ACP countries in Sections 2.2, 2.3 
and 2.4 of this study highlighted key issue on the need capture trade issues of a 
country by drafting trade Agreements properly. In this regard this Chapter will seek to 
                                                          
1
EPAs are Economic Partnership Agreements which the EU is currently negotiating with the 77 of its 
former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP). EPAs are essentially free trade 
agreements (FTA) that envisage the creation of a free trade area between the EU and the ACP 
countries in which there are no duties on goods imported and exported between these countries. 
South Centre „Understanding the Economic Partnership Agreements‟ Analytical Note 
SC/AN/TDP/EPA/1 (2007) 3 available at http://www.southcentre.org (3 February 2011). 
2
Bilal S „Redefining ACP-EU Trade Relations: Economic Partnership Agreements‟ (2006) 5 available 
at http://www.delbrb.ec.europa.eu/en/epa/epa_docs/epa_ECDPM_EPA_Dec06.pdf (accessed 3 
February 2011) (hereinafter Redefining ACP-EU Trade Relations). 
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address the research questions by analysing the provisions of the EAC-EU EPA to 
determine if the same hinders or accelerates trade development within the EAC.  
4.2 Overview of the ACP-EU EPA 
Part III of the Cotonou Agreement on economic and trade co-operation sets the path 
for replacing the current non-reciprocal preferential market access for the ACP group 
with World Trade Organisation (WTO) compatible new trade arrangements which 
were due to enter into force by 2008.3  
As response and efforts or compliance with the WTO rules, in September 2002, 
phase I of the negotiations were launched in Brussels and involved all ACP 
countries. Negotiations in this phase involved objectives and principles of the EPAs 
as well as issues of common interest to all ACP countries. This phase was 
concluded in 2003.4 
The second phase was at the regional level. The EU put a demand that the ACP 
countries form themselves into compatible regional configurations in order to hasten 
the negotiations and to enable countries negotiate Agreements that suited their 
varied needs.5 This phase begun in 2004 and is dealing with market access issues, 
development, trade in services, agriculture, fisheries and trade related issues such 
as intellectual property rights.6  It is in this phase that the negotiations devolved to 
the regional level with ACP splitting into six regional negotiating groups7 namely; the 
Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), Central Africa Monetary Union (CEMAC), Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC), Caribbean (CARIFORUM) and the pacific (PACP). Later 
                                                          
3
See Sections 1.1 and 2.4 of this study for a detailed analysis on the basis of which EPAs came to be 
negotiated. 
4
Ministry of trade, policy brief „background to EPAS: why Kenya needs to conclude EPAs with the EU: 
and EAC-EPA negotiations progress‟ (2008) 4 available at 
http://www.trade.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=87&Itemid=121 (accessed 3 
March 2011). 
5
Bilal S „Redefining ACP-EU Trade Relations‟ (2006) 3. 
6
Ministry of trade, Kenya „Background to EPAS: Why Kenya needs to conclude EPAs with the EU‟ 
Policy Brief (2008) 4 available at 
http://www.trade.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=87&Itemid=121 (accessed 3 
March 2011). 
7
Mayne M „Economic Partnership Agreements: a „Historic Step‟ Towards a Partnership of Equals?‟ 
(2008) 523 ODI Working Paper available at http://www.odi.org.uk (accessed 9 March 2011). 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
towards the end of 2007 as the deadline culminated another sub-group emerged 
from both ESA and SADC configurations comprising of the EAC countries.8 
The table below highlights the ACP configurations in terms of the current seven 
regional groupings. 
Table 1: ACP configuration and EPA signatories. 
Configuration Members Signatory states 
in December 
2009 
Countries falling 
into EBA/Standard 
GSP 
Proportion 
of 
signatory 
countries 
(%)  
Number of 
liberalisati
on 
schedules 
ESA EPA Comoros Djibouti 
Ethiopia 
Madagascar 
Malawi Mauritius 
Seychelles Sudan  
Zambia Zimbabwe 
Comoros 
Madagascar 
Mauritius 
Seychelles 
Zimbabwe  
Djibouti Eritrea 
Ethiopia Malawi 
Sudan Zambia  
45 5 
EAC EPA Burundi Kenya 
Rwanda Tanzania 
Uganda  
Burundi Kenya 
Rwanda 
Tanzania Uganda  
- 100 1 
SADC EPA Angola Botswana 
Lesotho 
Mozambique 
Namibia South 
Africa  Swaziland  
 Botswana 
Lesotho 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Swaziland 
Angola 71 2 
CEMAC EPA Cameroon Chad 
Central African 
Rep. Congo DR 
Congo Eq. Guinea 
Gabon S. Tome`/ 
Cameroon Chad Central 
African Rep. 
Congo DR Congo 
Eq. Guinea Gabon 
S. Tome`/ Principe 
12.5 1 
                                                          
8
Mayne M „Economic Partnership Agreements: a „Historic Step‟ Towards a Partnership of Equals?‟ 
(2008) ODI Working Paper available at http://www.odi.org.uk (accessed 9 March 2011). 
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Principe 
ECOWAS 
EPA 
Benin Burkina 
Faso Cape Verde 
Cote d`Ivoire 
Gambia Ghana 
Guinea Bissau 
Liberia Mali 
Mauritania Niger 
Nigeria Senegal 
Sierra Leone Togo 
Cote d`Ivoire 
Ghana 
Benin Burkina 
Faso Cape Verde 
Gambia Guinea 
Bissau Liberia Mali 
Mauritania Niger 
Nigeria Senegal 
Sierra Leone Togo 
13 2 
PACP EPA Cook Islands Fed. 
Micronesia Fiji 
Kiribati Marshall 
Islands Nauru 
Niue Palau Papau 
New Guinea 
Samoa Solomon 
Islands Togo 
Tuvalu Vanuatu 
Fiji Papau New 
Guinea  
Cook Islands Fed. 
Micronesia Kiribati 
Marshall Islands 
Nauru Niue Palau  
Samoa Solomon 
Islands Togo 
Tuvalu Vanuatu 
14 2 
CARIFORUM Antigua/Barbuda 
Bahamas 
Barbados Belize 
Dominica 
Dominican Rep. 
Grenada Guyana 
Haiti Jamaica St. 
Kitts/Nevis St. 
Lucia St. 
Vincent/Grenadine
s Suriname 
Trinidad/Tobago 
Antigua/Barbuda 
Bahamas 
Barbados Belize 
Dominica 
Dominican Rep. 
Grenada Guyana 
Haiti Jamaica St. 
Kitts/Nevis St. 
Lucia St. 
Vincent/Grenadin
es Suriname 
Trinidad/Tobago  
- 100 1 
Source: Mayne M „Economic Partnership Agreements: A „Historic Step‟ Towards a 
Partnership of Equals?‟ (2008). 
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The Cotonou Agreement sets out the following main principles of the EPAs; First 
principle is reciprocity: One of the main objectives of the EPAs is the establishment 
of a free trade area by liberalising trade through gradual elimination of all trade 
barriers between ACP-EU countries9 as enunciated under Article XXIV of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. This is a radically new 
element in the new ACP-EU trade relations and also a necessary principle to ensure 
that EPAs are WTO compatible. For the first time the ACP countries will have to 
open up on a reciprocal basis their own markets to EU products in order to retain 
their preferential access to the EU market.  
The second principle is development oriented:10 EPAs are meant to promote 
sustainable development and ultimately help in poverty reduction by enhancing the 
integration of ACP countries into the world trading system and supporting ACP 
regional economic integration. Therefore to the benefit of the ACP countries EPAs 
must be economically meaningful, politically sustainable and socially acceptable.11  
Regionalism is the third principle:12 EPA negotiations are taking place within seven 
regional groupings. These groupings are intended to strengthen regional integration 
which is seen as a first step towards integration into the world economy as well as a 
main instrument to stimulate investment and to lock in the necessary trade reforms.13  
Lastly the EPAs are supposed to embrace the principle of differentiation:14 EPAs 
should provide sufficient scope for flexibility, special and differential treatment and 
asymmetry so as to take into account the different levels of development of the 
contracting parties. In particular the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), small and 
vulnerable economies, landlocked countries and small islands should be able to 
benefit from special and differential treatment. 
These principles are replicated in Chapter 1 of the EAC-EU EPA. However, of 
importance to this study is the EAC-EU EPA  and the subsequent sections of this 
study shall focus on reviewing its provisions in order to reveal if the same will hinder 
or accelerate trade development within the EAC. 
                                                          
9
Article 37.7 of the Cotonou Agreement. 
10
Article 34 of the Cotonou Agreement. 
11
Bilal S „Redefining ACP-EU Trade Relations‟ (2006) 5. 
12
Article 35.2 of the Cotonou Agreement. 
13
Bilal S „Redefining ACP-EU Trade Relations‟ (2006) 5. 
14
Article 35.3 of the Cotonou Agreement. 
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4.3 The EAC-EU EPA 
The EU is the EAC‟s largest trading partner accounting for 19.9 per cent in 2009 
compared with 18.4 per cent recorded in 2008.15 In 2008 trade between EU and EAC 
amounted to €4.8billion. EAC‟s main exports to EU are agricultural (coffee, tea, 
spices, plants, fish and fish products) and horticultural products. While EAC‟s main 
imports from EU comprise of machinery (mechanical and electrical), pharmaceuticals 
and vehicles. Tables 1 and 2 below show the level of trade between the EU and EAC 
in 2008.16 
Table 1: EAC main exports to the EU (2008). 
Coffee and spices 27 % 
Plants and flowers 24% 
Fish products 11% 
Vegetables  10% 
Table 2: EAC main imports from the EU (2008). 
Mechanical machinery 23 % 
Electrical machinery 22% 
Pharmaceutical products 8% 
Vehicles   7% 
 
The EAC member countries are among the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
group of countries engaged in a trade relationship with the EU. One of the core 
objectives of the EAC is to promote free trade with an ultimate aim of forming a 
political union.17 There has been a speedy progress in integration of the region that 
                                                          
15
Briefing on EAC-EU EPA Negotiations available at 
http://www.eac.int/trade/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=121&Itemid=105 (accessed 
3 March 2011). 
16
European Commission „Economic Partnership Agreements‟ available at 
http://www.ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/economic (accessed 3 March 2011). 
17
Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the East African Community available at http://www.eac.int 
(accessed 5 February 2011). 
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culminated in a customs union in 2005 and a common market which was launched in 
June 2010. Thus negotiations of the EPA are in tandem with the objectives of the 
EAC as set out in the EAC Treaty. 
In the on-going EAC-EU EPA negotiations, the EAC countries are negotiating as a 
bloc despite their divergent interests internationally and the fact that they are all at 
different levels of development.18 One of the rationales for the EAC countries to 
negotiate EPA was that EPAs unlike the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)19 
are said to offer the option of a contractually secure trade regime which the EAC 
countries can use to stimulate investments targeting the EU market.  
In addition the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative provided for LDCs is a non-
binding unilateral measure and accordingly the EU reserves the right to withdraw or 
modify it at any time thus rendering the measure highly insecure.20 Strict rules of 
origin is another daunting challenge which the EBA beneficiaries face.21 In addition 
the LDCs within the EAC face huge structural and supply incapacities hence cannot 
meet the rules of origin requirements for exports of importance to them such as 
industrial and agricultural products which are of economic importance to these LDCs. 
Consequently these LDCs cannot fully utilise the EU‟s duty free quota free offer. 
Having evaluated the aforementioned reasons the EAC countries therefore decided 
to negotiate EPA. 
Because of the inability to conclude the full EPA negotiations by 31 December 2007 
to counter the expiration of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU proposed the initialling 
of interim/framework EPAs to provide a bridge until the conclusion of the full EPAs.22 
                                                          
18
Four of the EAC countries, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania are least developed countries 
while Kenya is a developing country. 
19
The Generalised System of Preferences  (GSP) are schemes of preferences under which selected 
products originating in developing countries are granted reduced or zero tariff rates over the MFN 
rates. The objectives of the GSP regimes is to increase export earnings in developing countries, 
promoting their industrialisation and accelerating rates of economic growth in these countries. The 
key down side of these trade regimes is that they are unilateral trade preferences and are not 
contractual hence granted at the whims of the EU thus making them unreliable. 
20
Ukpe A „Will EPAs Foster the Integration of Africa Into World Trade?‟ (2010) 54 Journal of African 
Law 215.  
21
Ukpe A „Will EPAs Foster the Integration of Africa Into World Trade?‟ (2010) 54 Journal of African 
Law 215.  
22
Status of EAC-EU EPA Negotiations held in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania on 9 June 2010, available 
at http://www.eac.int/news (accessed 25 August 2010).  
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The interim/framework EPAs contain a WTO compatible market access offer as well 
as a commitment to negotiate outstanding issues in the EPA. 
On 27 November 2007 in Kampala, Uganda the EAC countries and the EU initialled 
an Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPA) that consisted of the following 
sections:23 
 General Provisions (scope, objectives and principles). 
 Trade in Goods. 
 Fisheries. 
 Economic and Development Cooperation. 
 Provisions on areas for future negotiations. 
 Institutional & Final Provisions. 
 Annexes and Protocols (Customs duties on originating products, Rules of 
origin and Administrative matters). 
However, though having initialled an IEPA in 2007 none of the EAC countries has 
signed the final EPA despite parties setting dates for the signing of the same. On 
June 2010 at a meeting held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania the EAC member countries 
and the EU agreed to accelerate the negotiations towards a final EPA by the end of 
November 201024  however, this meeting never came to be and the EAC secretariat 
has alluded this to lack of funds on the part of EAC countries to fund further 
preparatory efforts.25  
The EAC-EU EPA negotiations seem to be taking a rather slow pace with only a 
single EAC EPA experts‟ meeting having been convened since the June 2010 
meeting. In response the EU delegations in the five EAC countries have agreed to 
provide funds to enable the technical level EAC negotiators to meet with the EU.26 
However, the efforts by EU delegations to provide funds seems to have hit a  snug 
following an objection by the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) to the use of 
                                                          
23
Briefing on EAC-EU EPA Negotiations available at http://www.eac.int (accessed 3 March 2011). 
24
Status of EAC-EU EPA Negotiations held in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania on 9 June 2010, available 
at http://www.eac.int/news (accessed 25 August 2010).  
25
Bilal S &Ramdoo I „Riding out the Storm: Will the EPAs Sink?‟ (2010) 14 available at 
http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/tni_en_9-9.pdf (accessed 3 March 2011). 
26
Bilal S &Ramdoo I „Riding out the Storm: Will the EPAs Sink?‟ (2010) 14 available at 
http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/tni_en_9-9.pdf (accessed 3 March 2011). 
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funds mobilised by the Secretariat from a development partner to facilitate the 
process.27 This seems to have taken the EAC-EU EPA negotiations to the drawing 
board until the EALA either approves use of the funds or the EAC countries obtain 
funds from another source. 
One of the challenges in concluding the negotiations is lack of consensus on the 
contentious issues such as export taxes and the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
clause among other clauses. On services the EAC countries have focused on 
expediting regional integration in the context of the EAC common market. As such 
discussions on services have not taken prominence with significant work outstanding 
on advancing a joint legal text as well as the preparation of possible requests and 
offers.28 
4.3.1 The EAC-EU EPA Market Access Offer 
The EU market access offer consists of duty free and quota free access for all EAC 
exports to the EU, except for arms and ammunitions for which the most favoured 
nation rates apply.29 
The EAC market access offer is based on reductions from the EAC Common 
External Tariffs (CET) and reductions of the tariffs will start in 2015. The EAC market 
access offer consists of liberalisation of 82.6 per cent of imports from the EU over a 
25 year transition period but 80 per cent will be liberalised over the next 15 years.30 
Liberalisation will occur in three tranches. The first tranche was slated for  2010 and 
involves only products with a CET of zero per cent that is, products covered in this 
phase do not attract any import taxes under the EAC Customs Union CET. Products 
                                                          
27
The EALA argues that using a grant from Swedish Development Agency (Sida) to finance the 
negotiations would not only compromise negotiations to the partner states‟ detriment but would as 
well prejudice and weaken stronger stance the EAC countries may adopt. Ubwani Z „EAC Economic 
Partnership Agreement Trade Talks Stall‟ Daily Nation 3 April 2011. Also available at 
http://www.tralac.org.   
28
Bilal S & Ramdoo I „Which Way Forward in the EPA Negotiations: Seeking Political Leadership to 
Address Bottlenecks‟ (2010) 8 available at http://www.ecdpm.org/dp100 (accessed 28 February 2011 
(hereafter Which Way Forward in the EPA Negotiations). 
29
Briefing on EAC-EU EPA negotiations. Available at http://www.eac.int/trade (accessed 3 March 
2011).  
30
Bilal S & Ramdoo I „Which Way Forward in the EPA Negotiations‟ (2010) 8. 
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falling under this category include raw materials or capital goods. These constitute 
65.4 per cent of EAC‟s imports from the EU.31 
The second phase will be between 2015 and 2023, where EAC countries will 
liberalise a further 14.6 per cent. Products in this category are intermediate inputs32 
and attract 10 per cent duty.33 
The third phase will be between 2020 and 2033, where the EAC countries will 
liberalise a further 2.6 per cent of her imports from the EU. Included in this phase are 
finished products whose availability at lower cost was deemed to have a positive 
effect on consumer welfare and not to have a potentially negative impact on EAC 
economies.34 
About one-fifth accounting for 17.4 per cent of EAC imports from the EU is excluded 
from liberalisation commitments under the EPA.35 These products constitute the EAC 
exclusion list or list of sensitive products. Criteria for including products on this list 
included contribution to rural development, employment, livelihood sustainability, 
promotion of food security, fostering infant industries, contribution to government 
revenues. All products subsidised by EU are also on this list. Therefore imports of 
these products from the EU under the EPA will face same import duties as imports 
coming from all other countries. 
The exclusion list consists of products which are deemed to contribute or to have a 
potential to contribute to increased production and trade competitiveness.36  
 
                                                          
31
Briefing on EAC-EU EPA negotiations. Available at http://www.eac.int/trade/ (accessed 3 March 
2011). 
32
These are goods and services other than fixed assets used as inputs into the production process of 
an establishment that are produced somewhere in the economy or are imported. A good example of 
such goods is car engines. 
33
Briefing on EAC-EU EPA negotiations. Available at http://www.eac.int/trade/ (accessed 3 March 
2011). 
34
Briefing on EAC-EU EPA negotiations. Available at http://www.eac.int/trade/ (accessed 3 March 
2011). 
35
 Briefing on EAC-EU EPA negotiations. Available at http://www.eac.int/trade/ (accessed 3 March 
2011). 
36
 For further reading on the EAC exclusion list see „Briefing on EAC-EU EPA negotiations‟ available 
at http://www.eac.int/trade 
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4.3.2 Negotiating Structures for the EAC-EU EPA 
At the initial stages of the negotiations four of the EAC countries (Burundi, Kenya, 
Uganda and Rwanda) were negotiating EPA under the ESA configuration while 
Republic of Tanzania was negotiating under SADC.37 Negotiating EPAs under 
different configurations posed a challenge for the EAC countries. This is due to the 
fact that by virtue of belonging to a customs union the EAC countries were bound by 
the EAC Customs Union Protocol and the EAC Customs Union Management Act to 
sign EPA as one customs territory.38  
In addition being a customs union means that the countries have a common external 
tariff policy hence this would have posed a problem within the EAC and more 
specifically for Tanzania which would be torn between applying two different tariffs 
rates under the auspices of EAC and SADC. In this regard on 13 October 2007 the 
EAC countries agreed to harmonise their market access offer to the EU under one 
bloc. 
The EAC negotiating structure comprises of the EAC ministers of trade, EAC senior 
officials (permanent secretaries in the trade ministries) and the National 
Development and Trade Policy Forum (NDTPF) which is a multi-sectoral forum 
(dealing with agriculture, trade, investment, services and other trade areas) 
comprising of representatives from the public and private sector organisations and 
the civil society organisations in the trade sector.39  
On the EU side negotiations are led by the spokesperson who is either a 
commissioner-director general trade or a director general of trade.40 
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Ukpe A „Will EPAs Foster the Integration of Africa Into World Trade?‟ (2010) 54 Journal of African 
Law 214. 
38
Ministry of trade, Kenya „Background to EPAS: Why Kenya needs to conclude EPAs with the EU‟ 
Policy Brief (2008) 4 available at 
http://www.trade.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=87&Itemid=121 (accessed 3 
March 2011). 
39
Ministry of trade, Kenya „Background to EPAS: Why Kenya needs to conclude EPAs with the EU‟ 
Policy Brief (2008) 5 available at 
http://www.trade.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=87&Itemid=121 (accessed 3 
March 2011). 
40
Ministry of trade, Kenya „Background to EPAS: Why Kenya needs to conclude EPAs with the EU‟ 
Policy Brief (2008) 5 available at 
http://www.trade.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=87&Itemid=121 (accessed 3 
March 2011). 
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4.4 Current Status of the EAC-EU EPA 
The EAC-EU EPA negotiations are taking a rather slow pace despite the parties‟ 
assurance of their commitments towards finalising the negotiations. Lack of 
consensus on the key outstanding issues has contributed to this low pace. On 9 
June 2010 trade ministers for the EAC countries and the commissioner for trade 
from the EU held a meeting in Dar es Salaam to come up with a solution on the 
outstanding issues in the IEPA. However, parties could not agree and the 
contentious issues were not fully addressed hence, it was not feasible to sign the 
IEPA as had been expected. As a way forward, both parties while issuing a joint 
communiqué agreed to finalize the comprehensive EPA Negotiations by end of 
November 2010. 
On 3 June 2010 the EALA Assembly passed a resolution urging the EAC countries 
to halt the signing of the EPA until the contentious issues in the IEPA are resolved.41 
Some of these issues are on the MFN clause, export taxes and the clause on 
economic and development cooperation. 
Negotiations for the comprehensive EPA are to cover:42 Customs and Trade 
Facilitation; Agriculture; Dispute Settlement Mechanism; Economic and Development 
Co-operation; Rules of Origin; Technical Barriers to Trade, Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures; Trade in Services; Trade Related Issues – i) Competition 
policy ii) Investment and private sector development iii) Trade, environment and 
sustainable development iv) Intellectual Property Rights and lastly v) Transparency 
in Public Procurement. Parties also agreed to negotiate and any other areas that the 
parties find necessary. It is evident that the comprehensive EAC-EU EPA is quite 
extensive compared to the IEPA as highlighted under Section 4.3 of this study. 
4.4.1 Contentious Issues in the EAC-EU EPA 
Upon initialling the IEPA on 27th November 2007, the EAC countries and the 
European Commission reviewed various articles of the IEPA. Most of these articles, 
                                                          
41
Resolution of the East African Community Legislative Assembly is available at http://www,eac.int 
(accessed 3 March 2011). 
42
Briefing on EAC-EU EPA negotiations. Available at http://www.eac.int/trade/ (accessed 3 March 
2011). 
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known as the “contentious” issues, have been the subject of extensive debate 
between both parties and still remain outstanding. These issues include: 
a) Export Taxes 
Article 15 of the EAC-EU EPA is to the effect that parties to this Agreement should 
not institute any new duties on goods exported to the other party. The decision on 
whether to allow the use of export tax on the conditions specified under Article 15 (2) 
is to be made by the EPA Council, which will also review its effects after 24 months. 
The EAC‟s concern with this Article is the impact that this restriction will have on its 
policy space in the use of export taxes as a trade policy instrument. The EAC 
Customs Management Act, 2004 provides for prohibited and restricted goods and it 
is to this effect that export of certain goods may be prohibited or restricted under the 
Act.43 In addition Section 82 the EAC Customs Management Act allows levying of 
export duties and hence if the EAC-EU EPA becomes binding the EAC countries will 
not be in a position to levy such taxes again. 
Although compatibility with the WTO rules remains the key issue in the EPAs, the 
GATT (1994) does not explicitly prevent countries from applying export taxes 
although implicitly, export taxes are also part of the regime of „customs duties‟. So far 
at the WTO, most countries have taken commitments to reduce duties only with 
regard to imports. However, several recently acceded WTO members including 
China, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine and Vietnam have committed in their 
accession negotiations to eliminate at least some export taxes with varying scope 
and economic effect of commitments.44 
Until now export taxes have remained a fairly under-regulated area of the WTO laws. 
In the recent years, it has become increasingly important and many countries have 
been imposing various forms of export restrictions on staple food in order to maintain 
domestic food security and contain rising food prices. In Kenya for example in 2008 
the government imposed export restrictions on maize to curb the food crisis as a 
                                                          
43
Article 70 of the East African Community Customs Management Act, 2004 (as amended in 2009). 
Full text available at http://www.revenue.go.ke/customs  (accessed 12 March 2011). 
44
Crosby D „WTO Legal Status and Evolving Practice of Export Taxes‟ International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development (2008) available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridges/32741/ (accessed 9 
February 2011). 
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result of the post-election violence. In this regard it would be imperative to leave 
export taxes to be matter of a policy choice to be invoked by parties when deemed 
appropriate for their future development rather than being restricted as in the case 
with EPA. 
Under the WTO, there are no rules prohibiting the use of export taxes. WTO rules do 
not expressly require countries to prohibit the use of export taxes. Therefore, there is 
no obligation to have a clause on export restrictions in the EPA and in case the 
parties agree to include it a simple reference to WTO rules could suffice. In addition 
the discipline on export taxes/restrictions could be left out of the EPA and be left to 
be resolved at the WTO. The EAC countries should negotiate the right to introduce 
temporary measures under specific circumstances in particular in cases of specific 
revenue needs and in cases of critical food shortage or for purposes of ensuring food 
security.  
Article 15(2) of the EAC-EU EPA allows EAC countries to impose export duties or 
taxes under two circumstances only; first in order to foster development of domestic 
industry and secondly to maintain currency value stability. These two instances are 
too few compared to flexibilities proposed in the SADC-EU EPA where temporary 
export duties can be introduced in cases of specific revenue needs; protection of 
infant industries; protection of environment; in case of critical food shortage or to 
ensure food security and where a country can justify industrial development needs. 
 The EAC countries should consider reviewing this Article and add more flexibility 
especially with regard to enhancing industrial development needs and cases of 
critical food shortage taking into account that EAC countries are net food importers.45 
b) Most Favoured Nation Treatment (MFN) Clause.  
MFN Clause is another highly debated clause in the EAC-EU EPA negotiations. The 
clause requires EAC countries to extend to the EU any more favourable treatment 
that they might give in the future to a „major trading economy‟. The MFN principle 
does not only cover tariffs but also rules of origin.  
                                                          
45
Net food importer is a country or a territory whose value of imported goods is higher than its value of 
exported goods over a given period of time. See FAO briefs on import surges available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/009/j8671e/j8671e00.pdf (accessed 12 February 2011). 
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Article 16 (1) and (2) of the EAC-EU EPA is to the effect that for future free trade 
Agreements, if the EU gives preferential treatment for example deeper market 
access to a third country the same treatment should be extended to the EAC. 
Consequently where EAC countries give preferential treatment to a developed 
country or any country accounting for more than 1 per cent or regional entities (such 
as customs union) accounting for over 1.5 per cent of world merchandise trade, the 
EAC countries should extend the same treatment to the EU. 
The EAC‟s concern is that the current provision would have an impact on EAC 
countries‟ possible bilateral negotiations, since any preference would be 
automatically extended to the EU. The WTO rules allow for bilateral preferences 
between developing countries in promoting South-South trade. This provision 
constrains the EAC countries‟ future trade Agreements with third parties.  
In addition the provision leaves very little policy space for EAC countries to negotiate 
ambitious trade Agreements in particular with other developed countries such as US 
and Australia and major trading economies46 for example China, India and Brazil or 
with other major regional groupings such as Mercado Comun del Sur  (MERCOSUR) 
and  Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Should the EAC countries 
commit to extend to the EU preferences they might accord to other major trading 
partners in the future, they will weaken their negotiating power vis-à-vis any 
important trading partner in particular given the increasing importance of new trading 
partners from the South.47 
This provision is thus tantamount to asking the EAC countries to bind themselves to 
the EU on future trade agreements whose terms are not yet known. The EU views it 
as a matter of „fairness‟ given its generous concessions under the EPA by providing 
duty free quota free market access to all products originating from EAC countries.  
Bilal & Ramdoo are of the opinion that the MFN clause is a political issue and as 
such a technical compromise would be most applicable by explicitly narrowing the 
scope of its application and relaxing the trigger mechanisms (in terms of joint 
                                                          
46
Article 16 (6) EAC-EU IEPA defines a major trading economy to be any developed country or a 
country accounting for a share of world merchandise exports above 1 per cent or any group of 
countries accounting collectively for a share of world merchandise exports above 1.5 per cent in the 
year before the entry into force of the preferential trade agreement in question. 
47
Bilal S & Ramdoo I „Which Way Forward in the EPA Negotiations‟ (2010) 18. 
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decision-making process and thresholds) for its application.48 In addition they shed 
some ideas on how to couch this clause to an extent that it is not constraining to both 
parties. First that the negotiating countries could raise the threshold (in terms of 
share of world trade) of what constitutes a major trading partner to such a level (for 
instance at 2.5 per cent) so that it excludes most developing countries from the 
potential application of the MFN principle.  
Secondly by including a „grand-fathering provision‟49 that would also extend any 
more favourable treatment given by the EU to Agreements it has concluded before 
the EPA to all EPA signatories. Knowing that the EU is currently engaged in a 
number of FTAs with many large developing countries, some of which are likely to be 
concluded before EPAs, this could be a „win-win‟ proposal if accepted by parties 
especially the EU.  
Lastly by agreeing to a non-automatic clause where before deciding to extend the 
treatment to the EU, parties agree to jointly examine the balance of benefits obtained 
under the Agreement with the third parties, compared to the EPA by considering 
such issues such as the margin of preferences, rules of origin and accompanying 
measures.50 
The MFN clause in the CARIFORUM EPA51 or the Pacific States interim EPA52 could 
be of good guidance to the EAC EPA negotiators. In the two regions the parties have 
committed to implement the MFN provision only after consultation, therefore 
removing any automatic and potentially arbitrary application of the MFN treatment. 
Article 19 (5) of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA states that: 
Where any signatory CARIFORUM state becomes party to a free trade agreement 
with a third party referred to in paragraph 2 and such a free trade agreement 
provides for more favourable treatment to such third party than that granted by the 
signatory CARIFORUM State to the EC Party pursuant to this Agreement, the Parties 
shall enter into consultations. The Parties may decide whether the concerned 
signatory CARIFORUM State may deny the more favourable treatment contained in 
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Bilal S & Ramdoo I „Which Way Forward in the EPA Negotiations‟ (2010) 18. 
49
A grandfather clause is an exception that allows an old rule to continue to apply to some existing 
situations while a new rule will apply to all future situations. 
50
Bilal S &Ramdoo I „Which Way Forward in the EPA Negotiations‟ (2010) 20. 
51
Article 19(5) of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
52
Articles 16 (3) &(4) of the Pacific States-EU IEPA. 
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the free trade agreement to the EC Party. The joint CARIFORUM-EC Council may 
adopt any necessary measures to adjust the provisions of this Agreement. 
On the other hand Article 16 (3) & (4) of the Pacific States-EU IEPA states that: 
(3) Where a Pacific State or the Pacific States can demonstrate that they have been 
offered by a third Party a substantially more favourable treatment in goods including 
rules of origin, than that offered by the EC Party, the Parties will consult and may 
jointly decide how best to implement the provisions of Paragraph 2. 
(4)The provisions of this Chapter shall not be so construed as to oblige the EC Party 
or any Pacific State to extend reciprocally any preferential treatment applicable as a 
result of the EC Party or any Pacific State being party to a free trade agreement with 
third parties on the date of signature of this Agreement. 
Accordingly these clauses prevent a scenario where neither of the parties can invoke 
the MFN provisions without consulting the other party. This is a strategy which 
should be adopted by the EAC negotiators and would play a major role in enhancing 
trade development within the EAC as far as engaging in trade with other major 
trading partners is concerned. 
Bilal & Ramdoo further observe that, the main problem of the MFN clause relates 
more to a question of principle, including on the negative precedent it would set. This 
is because the clause appears to lower the negotiating capacity of the EAC countries 
with other trading partners, since other parties would not agree to receive less 
favourable treatment than the EU.53 This is a very probable incident which the EAC 
negotiators ought to be very wary of because if they allow the current MFN clause in 
the EAC-EU EPA to remain as it is the EAC countries will never be in a position to 
grant less favourable concessions to other trading partners than those granted to the 
EU. In this regard this clause as currently drafted has the potential of hindering trade 
development within EAC with other major trading partners. 
c) Economic & Development Cooperation.  
The development cooperation provisions are part of the EPAs in recognition of the 
fact that changes to the trade regime will entail certain costs for the EAC in the short 
to medium term. Costs can be linked to institutional implementation of new rules as 
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well as to the adjustment of economic operators to the new regulatory framework. 
EAC countries just like other African countries have been insisting that EAC-EU EPA 
should be accompanied by a robust development package which can help these 
countries to cope with the negative effects54 of implementing the EPA. However, the 
EU is adamant on this issue and does not want to bind these commitments beyond 
the current European Development Fund (EDF) five year cycle.55 This can be 
deduced from the wording of Article 36 EAC-EU EPA which does not seem to offer 
anything over and above the current EDF. The Article states that;  
The EC Party confirms it will contribute towards the resources required for 
development under the 10th EDF Regional Indicative Programme, Aid for Trade and 
the EU budget. 
It therefore seems that African countries will have to look for alternatives to curb the 
negative effects of the EPAs especially with regard to fiscal losses. It is thus 
imperative that the EAC countries ensure that additional resources are made 
available to assist them in taking advantage of opportunities stemming from 
implementation of the EPA. 
d) Stand Still Clause 
This is another contentious issue in the EAC-EU EPA. Stand still clause appears 
under Article 13 of the EAC-EU EPA and is to the effect that parties agree not to 
increase their applied customs duties in their mutual trade. In essence this means 
that the EAC-EU EPA framework does not provide any possibility for the parties to 
increase their applied tariffs56 up to the bound tariffs57 taking into account the other 
duties and charges. 
This clause contradicts the WTO rules since under multilateral trading system parties 
can only commit with regard to bound tariff rates and not on applied tariff rates. This 
clause thus implies that the EAC members cannot change their applied rates within 
the limits of their bound tariffs. This is quite limiting and inconsistent with the WTO 
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Some of the likely negative effects include loss of tariff revenue as well as deindustrialisation as 
result of increased EU imports into African markets. 
55
South Centre „EPAs: The Wrong Development Model for Africa and Options for the Future‟ 
Analytical Note (2010) 7 available at http://www.southcentre.org (accessed 25 August 2010) hereafter 
„EPAs). 
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These are duties that are actually charged on imports and can be below the bound rates. 
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These are tariffs applied on imports and which a country has committed not to increase beyond the 
rate of duty beyond an agreed level. Once a rate has been bound it can only be raised if all affected 
parties are suitably compensated. Available at http://www.wto.org (accessed 23 February 2011). 
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rule that members‟ commitments concern their bound tariffs and not their applied 
tariffs.58Consequently the water level 59 in the tariffs is constrained and this puts EAC 
countries at a vulnerable state because water plays a very crucial role in setting up 
policy tools to balance the loss in fiscal revenue or to react in circumstances that 
need state intervention.60  
Accordingly trade experts have observed that the more the water between applied 
tariff rates and the bound tariff rates the less the chances of parties invoking 
safeguard measures such as dumping and subsidies. The reason behind this logic 
being that such countries have the option of increasing applied tariffs up to their 
bound tariff level before applying safeguard measures. This in turn has led to 
reduced number of disputes at the WTO.61 
Furthermore the provisions of Article 13 of the EAC-EU EPA which ensure that EAC 
members stick to their applied rates deny them the use of policy space which is 
available to them within the spheres of the WTO. This clause undermines the spirit of 
the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement62  which is to the effect that economic and 
trade cooperation shall be implemented in full conformity with the parties‟ obligations 
in the WTO. One is therefore left to wonder if Article 13 is really not inconsistent with 
the EAC countries‟ obligations to the WTO.  
The CARIFORUM, SADC and Pacific interim EPAs exhibit limited flexibility in their 
standstill clauses as the provision are applicable even to products which are not 
subject to tariff liberalisation commitments. This further raises questions about 
consistency and coherence of EU policy.63 
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Lecture notes on Doha Development Agenda by Dr.Edwini Kessie Legal Officer C-NTC Division 
World Trade Organisation. Lectures delivered from 30 August -2 September 2010 at the University of 
the Western Cape. 
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Water is the difference between bound tariff rates and applied tariff rates of a country. This is a 
tariffication method used by developing and least developed countries in the multilateral trading 
system. For further reading see Kerr WA & Gaisford JD „Handbook on International Trade Policy’ 
(2008) 220. 
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Lecture notes on Doha Development Agenda by Dr.Edwini Kessie Legal Officer C-NTC Division 
World Trade Organisation. Lectures delivered from 30 August -2 September 2010 at the University of 
the Western Cape. 
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Lecture notes by Dr. Edwini Kessie. 
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 Article 34 of the Cotonou Agreement. 
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Lui D & Bilal S „Contentious Issues in the EPA: Potential Flexibility in the Negotiations‟ available at 
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e) Rules of Origin 
Rules of Origin (RoO) define what an importing country considers the amount of 
value added in a good or service in a given exporting country sufficient for it to be 
counted as an export from that country.64 RoO can restrict the number of countries 
from which an exporting country may source its non-originating raw materials or 
components while still having its products defined as originating.65 The RoO under 
the Cotonou Agreement have been criticised as being very stringent and the LDCs 
within the EAC have not been able to take advantage of them even under the EBA 
initiative.66 
Article 37(b) of the EAC-EU EPA provides that parties shall continue to negotiate in 
outstanding trade and market access issues including RoO. The Interim EAC-EU 
EPA maintains the same RoO during the period of negotiations for the 
comprehensive EPA. One of the significant improvements is in the area of apparels 
and textiles. The EAC and the EU have agreed on simplification of the RoO to allow 
the EAC industries to source fabric from anywhere in the world and still export the 
garments made into the EU duty free and quota free.67 Alavi et al are of the opinion 
that is a great milestone in enhancing trade between EAC and other countries. In 
addition this will eventually boost intra-African trade as well as regional integration.68  
It is therefore vital that the EU and EAC negotiators agree on RoO that promote use 
of production inputs including raw materials within the ACP countries. 
f) Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards. 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) standards are measures applied by a country to 
protect humans, animals and plants from diseases, pests or contaminations.69 
Technical Barriers to Trade (NTB) on the other hand are non-tariff barriers to trade 
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Alavi A, Gibbon P & Mortensein J „EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: Institutional and 
Substantive Issues‟ (2007) 39 available at http://www.diis.dk (accessed 20 April 2011) (hereafter EU-
ACP Economic Partnership Agreements). 
65
Alavi A, Gibbon P & Mortensein J „EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements‟ (2007) 42. 
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which are used by countries to regulate markets, protect their consumers or preserve 
their natural resources.70 The prominence of the SPS measures has been due to 
increasing level of concern regarding food safety among European and other 
consumers about the presence of chemicals and various additives in their food. The 
EAC countries have always viewed that EU standards on food safety are very strict 
and such have been a hindrance for EAC exporters to access the EU market.71 
Article 37(c) of the EAC-EU EPA provides that parties agree to continue negotiations 
in the area of SPS measures and TBT. SPS provisions on the Cotonou Agreement 
are based on the WTO SPS Agreement72 and hence there is high likelihood of the 
EAC-EU EPA provisions on SPS being based on WTO SPS Agreement. According 
to Doherty the EU SPS measures are higher than the minimum standards set by the 
WTO hence a hindrance to the EAC exporters who lack capacity to meet such 
standards.73 In addition the EU keeps on changing these standards often within the 
course of a few months hence unpredictable. 
It is thus likely that the EAC exporters will continue to face stringent RoO which will 
limit the number of exports that can receive preferential treatment over increasing 
SPS standards which makes it difficult for the EAC exporters to access the EU 
market. 
f) Trade Related Issues 
With respect to trade related areas, the EU negotiating mandate appears to be more 
ambitious in terms of its demand on African countries than the Doha negotiations 
and the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement. Thus while it has been agreed to 
exclude negotiations on such issues as trade and investment, competition policy and 
government procurement from the Doha negotiations the EU mandate for the EPA  
negotiations contains explicit liberalisation on these trade related areas along with 
trade facilitation.  
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In addition Cotonou Agreement makes no reference to public procurement but the 
EU negotiating mandate demands progressive liberalisation of procurement markets. 
Cotonou Agreement calls for cooperation in creating a favourable, predictable and 
secure climate for investments, the EU on the other hand asks for establishment of a 
regulatory framework. The fact that African countries were opposed to the inclusion 
of these issues in the Doha negotiations suggest that similar demands by the EU in 
the EPA negotiations are viewed with so much suspicion and hence not received so 
well. Furthermore the fact that a new multilateral agreement on trade facilitation is 
currently under negotiations in the Doha negotiations this may well render the EPA 
related regional initiatives on the same issues redundant. 
4.5 Reciprocity in the EAC-EU EPA  
Reciprocity is defined as a fundamental rule by which parties maintain the balance of 
treatment by means of granting the same or equivalent rights and benefits and or 
undertaking obligations to each other.74 In the EPAs reciprocity entails that the ACP 
countries reduce their tariffs in return for market access to the EU.  
The key feature of the EPAs is reciprocity.75 Preference for reciprocity by the EU is 
also exhibited by the fact that substantial alternatives to EPAs which seem to differ 
with reciprocity principle such as the GSP plus regime for the ACP countries or the 
negotiations for a new WTO waiver.76 
The ACP countries are not quite comfortable with this concept of reciprocity. A 
statement by the former President of Botswana Festus Mogae in 2004 stated this in 
a joint parliamentary assembly at Brussels with regard to liberalisation confirms this. 
He stated as follows; 
 We fear that our economies will not be able to withstand the pressure associated 
 with liberalisation as prescribed by the World Trade Organisation. This therefore 
 challenges us all as partners to ensure that the outcome of the on-going  EPA 
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 negotiations  do not leave ACP countries more vulnerable to the vagaries of 
 globalisation and liberalisation, thus further marginalising their economies.
77 
According to the EAC-EU EPA which is still awaiting signature, over the next 25 
years, the EAC will liberalise 82.6 per cent of the imports from the EU by value 
(including 80 per cent over the first 15 years).78 This level of liberalisation is too high 
for a region that is still struggling economically and with a high level of infant 
industries. This has been a major borne of contention with the LDCs in the EAC 
asking for greater flexibility.  
The contention of the meaning of substantial liberalisation stems from the 
interpretation of Article XXIV GATT (1994) for which no pertinent jurisprudence exist. 
Interpretation of this article was first brought at the WTO dispute settlement body 
(DSU) in the Turkey case79 where the panel did not give a clear indication of what 
constitutes substantially all trade. The objective is not to arbitrarily interpret the WTO 
rule but to consider what level of market opening is both politically acceptable and 
defensible at the WTO.  
The meaning of phrases „substantially all trade‟ and „reasonable length of time‟ has 
been a subject of protracted debate and controversy not just between EU and ACP 
countries but also within WTO. The EU has always held the view that a liberalisation 
of 90 per cent of the trade between the parties to the EPAs is sufficient to meet the 
requirement of substantially all trade.80  
The problem is that there has never been an affirmative legal interpretation of what 
constitutes substantially all trade for example the Trade, Development and 
Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) signed between the EU and South Africa provides 
for liberalisation of 95 per cent by the EU and 86 per cent by South Africa achieving 
liberalisation of 90 per cent of trade between the parties.81 The EU has floated this 
Agreement as a precedent for the EU-ACP EPAs. However, a common view by 
many analysts concludes that the TDCA cannot be equated to EPAs. This is in the 
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light of the fact that South Africa is at a higher level of economic development than 
most if not all of the ACP countries.82 
According to many trade experts in the current context, any free trade agreement 
that would cover 70 per cent or more of trade over 15-20 years period is most likely 
to pass this WTO test and even so if one of the parties is an LDC or vulnerable 
economy.83  This study thus recommends that the EAC countries should strive to 
renegotiate for trade liberalisation within the range of 70-75 per cent. 
In 2005 the United Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA) forecasted that as a 
result of market liberalisation by African countries in the EPAs the EU firms will 
increase their exports by more than 20 per cent. Although consumer welfare will 
increase by US$509 million, fiscal losses amount to almost US$2 billion for Africa.84 
According to the UNECA simulations the EAC member countries will lose close to 
US$ 162 518 014 as a result of market liberalisation.85 This is such a huge loss 
which will have a negative effect on the level of trade within the EAC and as such if 
the region is set to sign the EPA there is need to come up with options to counteract 
the effects of these fiscal losses. 
The level of liberalisation as well the schedule of tariff dismantlement provided for in 
the EAC EPA will seriously impede on the member countries‟ ability to use fiscal 
revenue to finance development. This is because while the share of import duties in 
fiscal revenues had declined over time for most countries, poorer countries continue 
to depend more heavily on trade taxes as a source of revenue.86 A country like 
Burundi heavily depends on export taxes as a source of revenue and when all that is 
taken away as a result of liberalisation the country‟s development level is worst hit.87 
In addition to revenue losses the EAC countries will have to contend with high costs 
of structural adjustments while implementing the EAC-EU EPA. A study by the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund over the last three decades makes an 
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observation that structural adjustment policies imposing liberalisation have brought 
stagnation and even deindustrialisation in much of sub-Saharan Africa. The study 
makes reference to certain countries and with specificity to the EAC countries, in 
Tanzania and Uganda imports displaced local production of consumer goods 
causing large-scale unemployment. In Kenya this resulted in closure of industries in 
sectors such as beverages, tobacco, textiles, sugar, leather, cement and glass.88 
Another risk posed by increased EU imports into the EAC market is the likelihood of 
displacing local and regional suppliers of goods and services. According to Kenyan 
ministry of trade assessment 65 per cent of Kenyan industries are vulnerable to 
unfair competition with the EU.89 They include food processing, textiles, paper and 
printing companies. These firms employ more than 100 000 people. Furthermore, in 
East Africa, statistics show that the regional market for manufacturing is much more 
important for local producers than any other market. Kenya exports 67 per cent of its 
manufactured exports (which includes products like chocolates, soap and plastics) to 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Only nine per cent 
goes to the EU.90 More EU imports will mean displacement of the domestic and 
regional producers and lead to deindustrialisation which negatively impacts on trade 
development within EAC as well as regional integration. 
With regard to timeframe set for liberalisation, 15 years is such a short time for the 
EAC to liberalise 80 per cent of its market in addition the timeframe is not flexible 
enough as envisaged under Article 37.7 Cotonou Agreement which states that EPA 
negotiations would be as flexible as possible in establishing the duration of a 
sufficient transitional period, the final product coverage, taking into account sensitive 
sectors and the degree of asymmetry in the timetable for dismantling tariffs. Going 
by the wording of this article it is clear that the request by EU that the EAC countries 
liberalise 80 per cent of their market within 15 years is too constraining on the EAC 
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countries. Even developed countries have not religiously applied a 15 years‟ time 
frame as shown in the following five examples;91 
 Agreement between US and Morocco: 24 years for Morocco and 18 years for 
US.92 
 Agreement between Thailand and Australia: 20 years for Thailand and five 
years for Australia.93 
 Agreement between Thailand and New Zealand: 20 years for Thailand and 15 
years for New Zealand. 
 Agreement between United States (US) and Australia: 18 years for US and 25 
years for Australia.94 
 Agreement between Canada and Chile: 18 years for Chile and Canada 12 
years. 
Furthermore it should also be borne in mind that when the EAC countries sign the 
EPA granting EU such wide market access, the US and other countries are likely to 
ask the EAC countries for similar market access terms. It is unlikely that the US for 
instance will continue to provide the African Growth Opportunity Act95 (AGOA) but 
will also ask for an EPA-type Agreement requiring EAC countries to also liberalise. 
From the analysis above it is evident that reciprocity in EAC-EU EPA will have 
adverse effects on the EAC countries. This is due to the fact that the asymmetrical 
size in economic size between the EAC and the EU means that the EAC will have to 
make relatively larger concessions and bear disproportionate high costs of 
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adjustments than the EU. It is thus imperative that the EAC negotiators clearly 
analyse whether this level of liberalisation will accelerate or undermine trade and 
economic development within the EAC region and if it is not whether it is worthy 
going ahead with the negotiations. 
4.6 The Effects of EAC-EU EPA on Regional Integration 
Regional integration process as clearly observed in Section 3.3 of this study is 
emphasised as an important factor when considering regional groupings for EPA 
negotiations. Since the early 1970s, promotion of regional integration has been a 
central component of the EU‟s political and economic agenda in relation to 
developing countries.96 Regional integration is one of the key features in the EPAs. 
Article 2 of the Cotonou Agreement states in part that „particular emphasis should be 
placed on the regional dimensions‟. This same spirit of regional integration is 
emphasised in Article 35.2 Cotonou Agreement.97  
The debate about regional integration is interlinked to EPAs due to the fact that 
EPAs will have obvious consequences for existing regional blocs in Africa.98 Taking 
into account the existing regional groupings in ACP countries, the EU Commission 
was aware of the possibility of creating overlapping EPAs and therefore insisted that 
the ACP countries which are members of more than one regional grouping should 
commit to one regional grouping for the purpose of negotiating EPAs.99 This is the 
reason why Tanzania which was negotiating EPA under SADC opted to come back 
and negotiate under EAC. 
The SADC region is already experiencing some disintegration by virtue of the SADC-
EU EPA negotiations with some members (Mauritius, Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe) choosing to be part of the ESA group while Tanzania on the other hand 
opting to join the EAC group.100 This division is particularly alarming to the SADC 
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which is currently working on the implementation of its Trade Protocol with the aim of 
liberalising all trade amongst and coming up with a CET by the year 2012.101 
In SADC the actual implementation of the trade regime of the SADC EPA might have 
a certain fragmenting effect on the arrangement among the 15 members. According 
to Erasmus these countries will in future trade with the EU in about five different 
arrangements as follows: the TDCA, the SADC-EU EPA, the EBA initiative by virtue 
of the LDCs in SADC, the EAC by virtue of Tanzania‟s membership and ESA Group 
which comprises of three members of SADC as highlighted above.102 
On the other hand though EAC is negotiating EPA as a bloc however, just like SADC 
the members will also be affected by the SADC EPA terms by virtue of Tanzania‟s 
membership in SADC. As such most scholars are of the view that EU through EPAs 
has no sinister motive of dividing Africa and that the problem lies with Africa‟s 
integration schemes which are often in flux and have not matured to the point of 
clear and firm rules-based arrangements.103  
The southern and the eastern bloc seems to have to this realisation through the on-
going process of creating a tripartite FTA involving EAC, COMESA and SADC which 
will go a long way in solving the obstacles of regional integration as far as EPAs are 
concerned.104 
Another looming issue on regional integration as far as EPAs are concerned is the 
impact of TDCA on the (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) BLNS who are 
effectively „de facto’ parties to the TDCA. Because of the CET in SACU the BLNS 
will be forced to reduce their tariffs on imports from the EU at the rate agreed upon 
by South Africa in the TDCA. This will have an impact on the tariff revenue for the 
BLNS which has been estimated to be around 21 per cent decrease. Botswana is 
said will experience loss of around 10 per cent of its total national income as a result 
of the TDCA.105 In addition to the rules of origin provisions in the TDCA the BLNS will 
not be in a position to take advantage of the preferential access to the EU market 
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provided for South Africa. This is because most of these countries lack the capacity 
to meet stringent rules of origin under the TDCA. 
Erasmus observes that the wording of the many texts indicate that EPAs are 
designed to bolster the bilateral trade relationship between the parties within the 
rules of the multilateral system.106 Hence EPAs are not vehicles for actively pursuing 
and promoting the agenda underpinning the regional economic communities.  
4.7 Alternatives to the EPAS 
The justification for alternative to the EPAs is founded upon the provisions of Article 
37(6) of the Cotonou Agreement which states that; 
should non-LDC African, Caribbean and pacific (ACP) countries decide that they are 
not in a position to enter into economic partnership agreements.....(the European 
Community) will examine all alternative possibilities, in order to provide these 
countries with a new framework for trade which is equivalent to their existing situation 
and in conformity with the WTO rules. 
In essence by virtue of this provision the EU is legally bound to help non-LDC African 
countries seek an alternative trade arrangement other than the EPA. This alternative 
should provide them market access to the EU comparable to what they have 
received under Cotonou Agreement.107 Below are some of the alternatives that the 
EAC countries can adopt should a deal not be reached in the EAC-EU EPA 
negotiations.  
 
a) Moldova Treatment 
 
One of the alternatives to the EPAs available to Kenya being a non-LDC is a 
Moldova equivalent treatment. In January 2008 Moldova unilaterally received 
autonomous trade preferences from the EU.108 This arrangement gives Moldova 
almost similar market access under EBA preference scheme given to the LDCs. In 
justifying this action the EU commission in an explanatory memorandum stated that 
„Moldova is the poorest country on the European continent and to offer Moldova an 
improved access to the EU market would support the development of its economy 
                                                          
106
 Erasmus G „Deeper Regional Integration in SADC‟ (2011) 6. 
107
South Centre „EPAs‟ (2010) 4. 
108
Council Regulation (EC) No. 55/2008. 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
through increased export performance. The Commission further observed that it was 
clear that entering into negotiations on a free trade agreement with Moldova is not an 
option as Moldova does not possess the competitive strength to take on reciprocal 
obligations of such an arrangement with the EU‟.109 
 
This preferential treatment provided by the EU was approved by the WTO members 
without problems in March 2008. Kenya has a lower level of development (measured 
by per capita GDP) than Moldova and therefore deserving even better treatment 
than Moldova. 
 
b) European AGOA or financial crisis package for EAC 
 
The EAC countries should request the EU to provide an AGOA for them which can 
be achieved by providing a duty free access to the EU market for key tariff lines on 
which they are currently exporting to the EU.110 Calculations by the South Centre 
shows that such a package for Africa (the non-LDCs since the LDCs already enjoy 
the EBA) amounts to only about 100 tariff lines. The total amount of African exports 
to EU on these lines is US$6 billion a year. The import revenue foregone by the EU, 
assuming that the average duty on the US$6 billion is 10 per cent is only US$600 
million a year.111 This is a very meagre amount to the EU and if foregone can a 
financial contribution to Africa which has and is still suffering the effects of the 
financial crisis. 
 
c) Renegotiate Article XXIV at the WTO 
 
Article XXIV of the GATT (1994) relating to regional trade agreements and free trade 
agreements calls for the liberalisation of „substantially all the trade‟ in FTAs. Article 
XXIV is currently being renegotiated in the Doha Round. Paragraph 29 of the Doha 
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Declaration notes that „the negotiations shall take into account the development 
aspects of regional trade agreements‟.112 
In this regard the EAC countries and specifically Kenya (being the only developing 
country) should propose amendments to this article to ensure that as developing 
countries negotiate FTAs with developed countries, they are not required to liberalise 
„substantially all trade‟ (which the EU has interpreted to mean 80 per cent tariff 
liberalisation) but liberalisation which is asymmetrical whereby developing countries 
liberalise in accordance to their development needs. 
 
d) Negotiate for a goods-only EPA pegged to development benchmarks. 
 
Since the EAC countries have not yet signed the EPA they should ensure that it is 
strictly a goods-only EPA with no built-in clauses about future negotiations on 
services and a whole set of trade related issues. This is not needed for compliance 
with the WTO. The EU accepted this principle for Economic Community of West 
African States in June 2009 and thus should extend the same flexibility to EAC.113 
 
Importantly, liberalisation in goods should be done in keeping with development 
benchmarks that is only when the region has attained a certain level of development 
for example measured in terms of re capita GDP; per capita manufactured exports. 
The EAC countries should strive to ensure that the level of liberalisation is 
commensurate to the development level of the EAC this will also enhance economic 
growth within the region. Pegging liberalisation to development benchmarks is the 
only way to ensure that liberalisation is paced appropriately and is not fixed to an 
arbitrary and artificial timeline such as 15 years. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter concludes that EAC trade negotiators need to be vigilant 
in ensuring that the provisions of the EAC-EU EPA are geared towards trade 
development within the EAC. This is because though the EAC-EU EPA seems to be 
a better option than the GSP scheme it however contains some provisions that are 
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more stringent than those under the WTO.114 It is in this regard that the trade 
negotiators must ensure there are greater flexibilities in these provisions for EPA to 
foster trade development within the EAC.  
The preamble of the EAC-EU EPA is alive to the need for trade development within 
the EAC. Trade within the EAC is meagre, unable to develop and hampered by 
foreign market obstacles thereby causing substantial stagnation. it is no doubt that 
the EAC-EU EPA will contribute to enlarge the market for these countries. However, 
this enlarged market must be governed by a predictable and fair framework for trade 
which will enhance trade development within the region. It is against this background 
that this chapter involved a critical analysis of the provisions of the EAC-EU EPA. 
One of the key concerns is on the issue of compatibility of regional integration 
process in Africa and the EPA. Phasing down tariffs in favour of the EU before the 
elimination of intra-African trade barriers could disrupt the programme of regional 
integration under the AEC Treaty as it may not only lead to a continued reduction in 
intra-African trade but also reduce the concept of regional integration to mean the 
mere establishment of a CET by an EPA regional group vis a` vis the EU. Thus for 
regional integration to be enhanced through EPAs regional blocs must harmonise 
their CETs, lists of sensitive products and rules of origin. To this end EAC has been 
able to offer a harmonised CET and list of sensitive products. Rules of origin are still 
being negotiated. 
Moreover the level of trade liberalisation in the EAC-EU EPA is quite high bearing in 
mind that four of the five EAC countries are LDCs. It is therefore suggested that this 
level of liberalisation may not necessarily be good for EAC trade development to the 
extent that the benefits of liberalisation are not automatic and there are likely to be 
significant effects from opening up poor country‟s market to import from more 
developed economies without first building their export supply response and trade 
capacity. Thus for the EPA to accelerate trade development within the EAC, the 
trade interests must be well articulated in the final EAC-EU EPA.
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CHAPTER FIVE  
5.1 Conclusion and Recommendations 
This Chapter will attempt to mark out ways in which the challenges posed by the 
provisions of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the East African 
Community (EAC) and the European Union (EU) may be addressed. A critical 
analysis of the EAC-EU EPA reveals that the Agreement as it is will hinder trade 
development within the EAC.1 The numerous calls from African governments, the 
African union, the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European 
civil society groups for a revision of the EPA texts are a clear indication that most 
countries are not satisfied with the provisions of the EPAs.2 The EAC countries are 
among these countries that have exhibited dissatisfactions in the EPA provisions. 
The EAC-EU EPA is still in its initialled state implying that the parties have not 
signed the final Agreement. The EAC-EU final EPA was scheduled to be signed by 
end of November 2010.3 However, the same has not been signed with EAC 
countries citing financial constraints as the major reason. 
The contentious issues in the EAC-EU EPA reflect that these clauses are in dire 
need for renegotiations so as to capture the trade needs of the EAC countries.4 To 
this end this study proposes the following recommendations to these issues; 
a) Renegotiations on the contentious issues in the EAC-EU EPA. 
The EAC countries should renegotiate for a non-automatic Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) clause5  whereby before deciding to extend the treatment to the EU, parties 
agree to jointly examine the balance of benefits obtained under the Agreement with 
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raised by African Heads of States during the second African –EU Summit. A communiqué on the 
summit is available at http://au.int/en/dp/ti/news (accessed 12 April 20110. 
3
See Section 4.4 of this study on current status of the EAC-EU EPA negotiations. Further details on 
the same available at http://www.eac.int/trade (accessed 9 March 2011). 
4
See Section 4.4.1 of this study for analysis of the contentious issues in the EAC-EU EPA. 
5
Article 16 of the EAC-EU EPA. Section 4.4.1 of this study for a detailed discussion on the MFN 
clause. 
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the third parties, compared to the EPA by considering such issues such as the 
margin of preferences, rules of origin and accompanying measures.6 
The MFN clause in the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) EPA7 or the Pacific States 
interim EPA8 could be of good guidance to the EAC EPA negotiators.9 In the two 
regions the parties have committed to implement the MFN provision only after 
consultation, therefore removing any automatic and potentially arbitrary application 
of the MFN treatment. If couched that way such the MFN clause in the EAC-EU EPA 
would play a major role in enhancing trade development within the EAC since it 
would not hinder EAC countries from concluding trade Agreements with other major 
trading partners is concerned. 
Further suggestions would be explicitly narrowing the scope of MFN clause‟s 
application and relaxing the trigger mechanisms (in terms of joint decision-making 
process and thresholds) for its application.10 In this regard the EAC countries could 
propose to raise the threshold (in terms of share of world trade) of what constitutes a 
major trading partner to such a level (for instance at 2.5 per cent) so that it excludes 
most developing countries from the potential application of the MFN clause. This 
would see many of the major economic countries falling outside the provisions of this 
clause meaning that any more favourable treatment accorded to them by the EAC 
countries would not be accorded to the EU. This study also proposes that deleting 
this clause from the EAC-EU EPA would be the best option. 
The standstill clause11 essentially freezes increase of applied customs duties on all 
products traded between the EU and the EAC whether or not these products have 
been excluded from liberalisation. It is the proposition of this study that the EAC 
negotiators aim at achieving a clear distinction as to which products the provision 
applies to. This is because the clause as it is now does not specify whether it applies 
to liberalised products and or on those on the exclusion list such as agricultural 
                                                          
6
For further reading see Bilal S &Ramdoo I „Which Way Forward in the EPA Negotiations: Seeking 
Political Leadership to address bottlenecks‟ (2010) 20 available at http://www.ecdpm.org . 
7
Article 19(5) of the CARIFORUM-EU EPA. 
8
Articles 16 (3) &(4) of the Pacific States-EU IEPA. 
9
 See Section 4.4.1 of this study. 
10
For further reading see Bilal S & Ramdoo I „Which Way Forward in the EPA Negotiations: seeking 
political leadership to address bottlenecks (2010) available at http://www.ecdpm.org.  
11
See Section 4.4.1 of this study for a detailed analysis of the standstill clause. 
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products. In the CARIFORUM and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
EPAs, the standstill clause applies only to liberalised products. This flexibility should 
also be extended to the EAC countries. However, the better option would be to 
remove the clause from the Agreement since EAC countries are net food importers 
and as such there is need to safeguard food security and the agricultural sector in 
the region. 
Export taxes clause is another contentious clause which prohibits parties to the EAC-
EU EPA from instituting any new duties or taxes on goods exported to the other 
party. Article 15 of the EAC-EU EPA allows EAC countries to impose export duties or 
taxes under two circumstances only; first in order to foster development of domestic 
industry and secondly to maintain currency value stability. These two instances are 
too few compared to flexibilities proposed in the SADC-EU EPA12 where temporary 
export duties can be introduced in cases of specific revenue needs; protection of 
infant industries; protection of environment; in case of critical food shortage or to 
ensure food security and where a country can justify industrial development needs. 
The EAC countries should consider reviewing this Article and add more flexibility 
especially with regard to enhancing industrial development needs and cases of 
critical food shortage taking into account that EAC countries are net food importers. 
Further under the World Trade Organisation (WTO), there are no rules prohibiting 
the use of export taxes. Therefore, there is no obligation to have a clause on export 
restrictions in the EPA  however should the EAC and the EU agree to include this 
study proposes that a simple reference to the WTO rules could suffice. In addition 
the discipline on export taxes restrictions could be left out of the EPA‟s mandate and 
remain to be resolved at the WTO.  
Article 36 of EAC-EU EPA on economic and development cooperation is another 
clause which calls for renegotiations. As highlighted in Section 4.4.1 of this study this 
clause is meant to caution costs related to implementation of the EAC-EU EPA for 
example the regulatory reforms that the EAC will have to undertake which will lead to 
fiscal losses. This study therefore recommends that the EAC countries insist that this 
clause includes a robust development package which can help these countries to 
                                                          
12
See Section 4.4.1 of this study on how the SADC-EU EPA provides for export taxes. 
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cope with the negative effects13 of implementing the EPA. The EAC countries should 
also ensure that in addition to the European Development Fund (EDF) and Aid for 
Trade more resources are made available to assist them in taking advantage of 
opportunities stemming from implementation of the EPA. 
This study has revealed that the level of liberalisation requested by the EU from EAC 
is quite ambitious taking into consideration the economic level of the EAC 
countries.14 In the EAC-EU EPA, EAC countries are supposed to liberalise 82.6 per 
cent of the imports from the EU within 25 years (however, 80 per cent will be 
liberalised over the first 15 years). Section 4.5 of this study has pointed out examples 
of Agreements entered into between developed countries and have longer time 
frame for liberalisation. This study thus recommends the EAC countries make a case 
for renegotiating for a longer period of liberalisation to enable the infant industries in 
the region to prepare adequately and adjust to competition by goods from the EU 
market.  
The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) within the EAC should continue to enjoy the 
Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative whether or not EAC-EU EPA is concluded. To 
this end these LDCs should not have to reciprocate any EU concessions in line with 
the WTO rules and under the Doha Work Programme. This study observes that 
reciprocity if any should be subject to fairly long transition periods and attainment of 
certain levels of competitiveness in given sectors. Thus the requirements of Article 
XXIV GATT (1994) on elimination of duties on substantially all trade can be met 
without reciprocity from the LDCs. 
This study clearly shows that EAC-EU EPA will have a distorting effect on regional 
integration process within the EAC more so due to the fact that the tariff elimination 
schedules in the EAC-EU EPA are inconsistent with the three tier band system for 
common external tariff applied under the EAC Customs Union.15 To this end there 
should be harmonisation of the tariff elimination schedules to avoid conflict of the 
elimination schedules under the EAC-EU EPA and in the EAC Customs Union. 
                                                          
13
Some of the likely negative effects include loss of tariff revenue as well as deindustrialisation as 
result of increased EU imports into African markets. 
14
See Section 4.3.1 of this study on the level and phases of liberalisation by the EAC countries. See 
also Section 4.5 of this study on effects of reciprocity on EAC‟s trade development. 
15
See Sections 3.6 and 4.6 of this study on effects of EPA on regional integration and intra-African 
trade. 
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The EAC-EU EPA should have comprehensive clauses on regional integration 
clearly providing for the precedence of regional integration over EPAs. This will 
enable review of the EAC-EU EPA at the attainment of landmark stages such as the 
formation of regional and continental customs union and monetary union. This is 
because EAC is still in the process of realising its regional integration levels and as 
such the EAC-EU EPA should take cognisance of such facts. 
This study commends the on-going process of creating a tripartite Free Trade Area 
(FTA) involving EAC, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
and SADC which will be a major step in harmonising the tariff levels in these regions 
hence an appraisal to regional integration efforts. This will go a long way in solving 
the obstacles of regional integration as far as EPAs are concerned.  
Lastly should the EAC and the EU fail to reach an agreement on EPA negotiations it 
is recommended that the EAC countries pursue other alternatives to EPAs as 
discussed in this study. These alternatives are: Moldova treatment,16 European 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),17 renegotiate article XXIV at the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO)18 and negotiate for goods-only EPA.19 
Critical analysis of the provisions of EAC-EU EPA clearly demonstrates that for an 
Agreement to be reached there must be concessions from both the EAC and the EU. 
In addition political goodwill will play a major role in concluding the negotiations.20  
In conclusion this study analysed the provisions of the EAC-EU EPA with a view to 
establishing whether the same hinders or accelerates trade development within the 
EAC. Most of the clauses as seen in section 4.4.1 of this study have serious 
negative implications for EAC‟s trade development. It has been demonstrated that 
most clauses are too demanding and have more restrictions than those in the WTO 
and as such EAC countries have a great task ahead of them to seek renegotiations 
of these clauses. 
                                                          
16
See Section 4.7 of this study. 
17
See Section 4.7 of this study. 
18
See Section 4.7 of this study. 
19
See Section 4.7 of this study. 
20
For further reading on political goodwill in EPAs see Lui D & Bilal S „Contentious Issues in the EPA: 
Potential Flexibility in the Negotiations‟ (2010) 13 available at http://www.ecdpm.org (accessed 8 
February 2011). 
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However, the importance of concluding the EAC-EU EPA cannot be underscored 
especially with regard to Kenya which is a non-LDC would face tariffs on its key 
exports to the EU market if it does not sign the EPA. However, for reasons illustrated 
above and after having examined the contentious clauses most provisions in the 
EAC-EU EPA would be detrimental to the EAC‟s trade development. The likelihood 
that those provisions undermine potential trade development within the EAC cannot 
be underscored and hence the EAC trade negotiators must be vigilant in ensuring 
those contentious issues are renegotiated and reflect best interest of the EAC 
countries as far as trade development is concerned.  
In light of the foregoing it is also imperative that the EAC trade negotiators keep in 
mind that resolving the contentious issues only in the EAC-EU EPA will not itself 
solve the challenges encountered by EAC exporters to the EU market. In this regard 
in order to harness benefits of EPA to the EAC countries, both the EU and the EAC 
countries need to address other related issues such as supply-side constraints, 
technical regulations and standards to trade imposed by the EU countries and trade 
facilitation.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
For further reading see United Nations Economic Commission for Africa „Assessing Regional 
Integration in Africa IV: Intra-African Trade (2010) 14 also available at http://www.uneca.org/. 
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